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  INTRODUCTION   
More than fifty years ago, the legal scholars Henry Hart 
and Albert Sacks famously observed that ―[t]he hard truth of 
the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, gener-
ally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory in-
terpretation.‖1 To be sure, it would be an exaggeration to pre-
sent the enterprise of statutory interpretation as wholly 
chaotic. In practice, there is widespread agreement on the cen-
trality of statutory text, there is an established toolkit of inter-
pretive canons, and there are enduring frameworks that struc-
ture courts‘ statutory analyses. Still, commentators agree that 
Hart and Sacks‘s observation about the unsettled state of stat-
utory interpretation remains apt today.2 
Yet while an absence of consensus in statutory interpreta-
tion is nothing new, it seems that people have lately become 
less content with this state of affairs. Indeed, one of the more 
interesting recent developments in the field of statutory inter-
pretation has been the growing chorus of calls for more struc-
ture and predictability in interpretive methodology. In particu-
lar, several scholars have called for treating interpretive 
methodology as binding law that should be honored as a matter 
of stare decisis.3 That is, just as the Supreme Court might de-
 
 1. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., West Academic 1994) (1958). 
 2. E.g., KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRE-
TATION 43 (2013); Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 855 (2013). 
 3. E.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statu-
tory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1866–67 (2008); Jordan 
Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare 
Decisis As Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 708–14 
(2008); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Method-
ology As “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1909–18 (2011) 
(discussing whether interpretive methodology is binding law); Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
2085, 2145–56 (2002) (arguing for the codification of binding interpretive 
rules). 
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cide in a particular case whether a bicycle is a ―vehicle‖ within 
the meaning of some statute, so too should the Court decide, 
with precedential force that would bind itself and the lower 
courts, whether legislative history may be used to resolve stat-
utory ambiguities, whether one particular dictionary is more 
authoritative than another, when to apply a presumption 
against federal preemption of state law, and the like.  
A second budding line of inquiry in the field of statutory 
interpretation concerns the empirical realities of statutory in-
terpretation in courts that are not the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
usual academic focus on the Supreme Court has meant that we 
do not know very much about the interpretive practices of the 
lower federal courts and the state courts, but thankfully this is 
starting to change. To choose two notable contributions, Abbe 
Gluck has shed light on interesting developments in several 
states, and Frank Cross has tracked some broad patterns of in-
terpretive methodology in the federal courts of appeals.4  
This Article explores the fruitful, yet largely uncharted, 
territory found at the intersection of the two lines of inquiry 
just described. That is, it considers the relationship between 
the Supreme Court‘s methodological practices, haphazard and 
inconsistent as they sometimes are, and the behavior of other 
courts. More specifically, this Article concerns whether and 
how the lower federal courts respond to changes in the Su-
preme Court‘s interpretive practices.5 Instructions and diseases 
are both communicable in their different ways, but what about 
the Supreme Court‘s canons of interpretation? When there are 
discernable trends in the Supreme Court‘s practices, do the 
lower courts‘ practices tend to move in parallel? When the Su-
preme Court modifies a particular interpretive canon, invents a 
new one, or disapproves an old one, how do the lower courts 
tend to react? What factors—regarding the Court‘s opinion, the 
nature of the canon involved, or other contextual considera-
tions—affect the lower courts‘ behavior?  
 
 4. FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTER-
PRETATION 180–200 (2009); Abbe R. Gluck, The States As Laboratories of 
Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified 
Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1771–1811 (2010). 
 5. My focus on the federal courts is not meant to deny that the state 
courts are interesting and important; certainly they are more important nu-
merically. But studying the state courts introduces some additional complica-
tions, see infra note 21, and so it makes sense to begin with the lower federal 
courts. Future work might study how state courts respond to the U.S. Su-
preme Court and to their own state supreme court. 
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Answering such questions about the linkages between dif-
ferent courts‘ interpretive regimes would be valuable for two 
reasons. First, the answers would be interesting in their own 
right, as they would contribute to our still-nascent understand-
ing of the lower courts‘ behavior. The vast majority of the cases 
in the federal system are decided in the lower courts, so the 
Supreme Court cannot meaningfully change the interpretive 
regime without their assistance. Yet we still know relatively 
little about the lower courts‘ interpretive practices and how 
those practices correspond (or do not) to those of the Supreme 
Court. Second, a fuller understanding of current lower-court 
behavior can help us evaluate the movement for a more formal 
system of methodological stare decisis. Examining how the low-
er courts respond to the Supreme Court‘s signals today might 
help us estimate the likely effects and benefits were the courts 
to develop a more strictly precedential approach in the future. 
The Article unfolds as follows: 
Part I briefly situates this project within the existing de-
bates over interpretive uniformity and methodological stare de-
cisis. It also addresses my approach to selecting the Article‘s 
set of case studies of interpretive change. 
Part II begins the study of how canons are communicated 
through the judicial system by examining some large-scale pat-
terns over the last several decades. Existing evidence shows 
that the Supreme Court and the lower courts tended to move 
roughly in parallel with regard to several aspects of their in-
terpretive approaches. I present some new evidence of parallel-
ism. Specifically, as the Supreme Court became more favorably 
disposed toward textualist tools like linguistic canons in recent 
decades, so did the lower courts. 
The next several parts then turn the focus toward more 
particular episodes and issues in canonical evolution. Some-
times the Supreme Court invents a new canon or modifies an 
old one; sometimes it lets a canon fall into disuse. When the 
Court changes its interpretive regime in these kinds of ways, 
that event creates an opportunity to observe how the lower 
courts respond. The results reveal a variety of dynamics and 
patterns, some expected but others quite surprising. As Part III 
shows, the lower courts have the capacity, given the right con-
ditions, to catch on very quickly to changes in the Supreme 
Court‘s interpretive regime. In other situations, illustrated in 
Part IV, canons seem rather impervious to modification. In still 
other instances, one finds zombie canons that linger in the low-
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er courts despite their demise in the Supreme Court (Part V.A) 
or canons that take off in the lower courts like pathogens es-
caped from the lab (Part V.B). Part VI addresses the issue of 
how an idea crystallizes into an interpretive canon. The inves-
tigations undertaken in Parts III through VI draw on a range 
of interpretive canons and doctrines, including linguistic can-
ons such as ejusdem generis and the rule of the last antecedent, 
substantive canons governing civil-rights statutes and jurisdic-
tional statutes, the doctrines governing judicial deference to 
agency interpretations, and the ―no elephants in mouseholes‖ 
rule. 
With the benefit of the investigations just described, Part 
VII then draws some tentative lessons about how canons prop-
agate through the system and which features—of the canons, of 
the lower courts, and of the broader institutional context be-
yond the judiciary—either enhance or inhibit accurate commu-
nication. Although this Article‘s case studies can identify fac-
tors that plausibly have generalizable effects, one overriding 
conclusion is that the interpretive regime is a complicated sys-
tem about which we still have only a very partial understand-
ing. Modifying the interpretive regime is not a simple matter of 
top-down instruction from the Supreme Court to lower courts 
but rather involves multiple potentially relevant actors and 
factors whose interactions defy simple explanations. The find-
ings also illustrate the limits of the movement to give interpre-
tive methodology more binding precedential effect. Specifically, 
that movement appears to underestimate the degree to which 
the system already displays forms of methodological precedent 
as a practical matter, to misunderstand the factors preventing 
the system from displaying more precedential behavior, and, as 
a result, to overestimate the potential for formally binding 
rules to improve the system. 
I.  INCONSISTENCY AND AUTHORITY IN INTERPRETIVE 
METHODOLOGY   
This Part frames the inquiry by providing some brief com-
ments on interpretive methodology and stare decisis and then 
explaining my own research methods. 
A. METHODOLOGY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
This Article concerns the judicial methodology of statutory 
interpretation—that is, how courts approach questions about 
the meaning of statutory text. The focus on the interpretation 
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of statutes, rather than constitutions or other legal texts, is ap-
propriate for a few reasons. First, although some principles ap-
ply to the interpretation of any instrument (e.g., read the text 
as a whole), statutory interpretation in particular has a rich 
toolkit consisting of scores of rules ranging from linguistic can-
ons (noscitur a sociis, in pari materia, and so on) to substantive 
presumptions (like the rule that Congress is presumed not to 
legislate extraterritorially) to rules about the use of extrinsic 
sources (such as rules governing the force of legislative history 
and administrative guidance).6 Second, occasions for statutory 
interpretation confront both the Supreme Court and the lower 
courts routinely.7 By contrast, it is quite rare for the lower 
courts to engage in genuine constitutional interpretation: most 
areas of constitutional law are so thick with Supreme Court 
case law that the lower courts‘ analyses are almost entirely de-
voted to parsing the relevant precedents.8 Therefore, for a 
study of how lower courts‘ methodologies respond to the Su-
preme Court‘s practices, statutory interpretation is the most 
promising focus. 
Interpretive methodologies do not determine bottom-line 
case outcomes in a clear way. Judges who disagree about the 
proper interpretive approach often converge on the same an-
swer in a given case, such that their methodological disagree-
ment was inconsequential. At the same time, agreement on 
matters of interpretive method does not guarantee agreement 
on particular results.9 Therefore, one does not have to be an ex-
treme skeptic about judicial rhetoric to acknowledge that it is 
hard to know how changes in the interpretive rules affect out-
comes. The Supreme Court‘s famous Chevron decision10 estab-
 
 6. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1195–215 (5th 
ed. 2014) (listing scores of interpretive doctrines and canons used by the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts). 
 7. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Informing the Public About the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Work, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 282 (1998) (pointing out that the 
majority of issues in front of the federal courts are issues of statutory interpre-
tation). 
 8. See Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” 
Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 
849–50 (1993). 
 9. See Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? 
An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 882 
(2006) (finding, in a study of the Seventh Circuit, that differences in interpre-
tive approach did not explain the disagreements in the few cases in which the 
judges disagreed). 
 10. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
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lished an extraordinarily influential doctrinal framework for 
assessing the validity of agency statutory interpretations, and 
so one would think that Chevron, of all things, must affect out-
comes. And yet it is difficult to prove that Chevron increased 
the amount of leeway courts afford agency interpretations.11  
Nonetheless, even if one cannot easily draw a straight line 
between interpretive methodology and bottom-line outcomes, 
the methodology used by lower courts—and how their method-
ology responds to the Supreme Court‘s signals—still matters 
for numerous reasons. The governing interpretive regime struc-
tures the courts‘ analyses and emphasizes certain factors and 
arguments over others, thereby making certain decisional 
pathways easier or tougher to follow.12 And even if there were 
no ultimate impact on case outcomes, the interpretive regime 
affects how judges justify their decisions and how attorneys 
must advocate for positions, both of which are important in 
their own right.13 
B. METHODOLOGICAL INCONSISTENCY AND METHODOLOGICAL  
STARE DECISIS 
Our Supreme Court Justices differ in their approaches to 
statutory interpretation. Textualists like Justice Scalia and ec-
lectic purposivists like Justice Breyer disagree over such things 
as the relative importance of dictionary meanings versus legis-
lative purposes, how to incorporate consideration of practical 
consequences, and so forth—and these disagreements stem in 
part from deeper divisions over the judge‘s place in the consti-
tutional structure.14 In addition, even the same Justice might 
display some variation in his or her own methods from case to 
case, such as by invoking a certain presumption in one case but 
not another or relying on a legalistic definition one day but fa-
 
(1984). 
 11. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION 772–75 (2d ed. 2013) (summarizing the empirical evidence).  
 12. Cf. Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes 
in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 305–06, 308–
10 (2002) (describing ―jurisprudential regimes‖—the frameworks that struc-
ture and influence judicial decision making by mediating between case facts 
and outcomes). 
 13. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in 
Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legisla-
tive History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998). 
 14. See Jerry Mashaw, As if Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 
1686 (1988) (―Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about 
constitutional law.‖). 
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voring a popular meaning the next. The Court as a whole is ac-
cordingly inconsistent in its methodology, as many have com-
plained.15 
Still, mere disagreement among the Justices may not fully 
explain the Court‘s methodological inconsistency. The Justices 
disagree about many things, and yet the law itself can still be 
mostly predictable and consistent because the Justices do not 
approach every legal question from scratch. Stare decisis is not 
absolute on the Supreme Court,16 but it is the norm, and as a 
practical matter prior decisions are routinely followed. (For the 
Supreme Court, this adherence to precedent primarily mani-
fests itself through case selection rather than through positive 
reaffirmation of prior holdings: the Court ordinarily does not 
review cases just to reiterate settled points of law.)  
The Court‘s methodological inconsistency arises, then, not 
just from pluralism and disagreement but also from its inabil-
ity or unwillingness to give ordinary stare decisis effect to ques-
tions of interpretive methodology. The Court regards a particu-
lar case as authoritatively resolving a particular question—e.g., 
is a houseboat a ―vessel‖ within the meaning of a certain stat-
ute?—but the Court does not, or at least not to the same de-
gree, regard that case as settling various questions of interpre-
tive approach that might arise along the way—e.g., whether 
meaning is fixed at the time of enactment or can evolve in light 
of current needs, whether judges should adhere more to legisla-
tive purposes or dictionary definitions, which dictionary is pre-
ferred, and so on.17  
Now, one should not exaggerate the degree of methodologi-
cal inconsistency on display. Even without formally binding 
precedent, there is common ground and a degree of regularity 
to judicial interpretive practices. Purposivists and intentional-
ists, just like textualists, ordinarily regard the statutory text as 
 
 15. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.  
 16. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (―Stare decisis is not 
an inexorable command . . . .‖). 
 17. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 3, at 1872–84 (explaining that the Su-
preme Court does not give decisions about interpretive methodology ordinary 
binding effect); Gluck, supra note 3, at 1910 (―[T]he Court does not generally 
give formal stare decisis effect to its statements about statutory interpretation 
methodology.‖); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judi-
cial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 389 (2005) (―[W]hen 
the Court issues opinions interpreting statutes, stare decisis effect attaches to 
the ultimate holding as to the meaning of the particular statute interpreted, 
but not to the general methodological pronouncements, no matter how appar-
ently firm.‖).  
BRUHL_5fmt 1/3/2016 1:04 PM 
2015] COMMUNICATING THE CANONS 489 
 
the most important source.18 There are dozens of familiar tex-
tual and substantive canons (ejusdem generis, the ―whole act‖ 
rule, the presumption against retroactivity, the canon of consti-
tutional avoidance, and so on and so on), none of which is out-
come determinative but all of which have a regular place in the 
Court‘s interpretive toolkit.19 There are established interpre-
tive frameworks like Chevron, the two-step test for judging the 
permissibility of an agency‘s interpretation of gaps or ambigui-
ties in a statute it administers.20  
The goal for the advocates of methodological stare decisis is 
to strengthen these regularities and expand their domain to 
cover more of the remaining points of disagreement, generating 
something like a binding law of interpretation. And although 
their admonitions are aimed mostly at the Supreme Court, they 
want methodological stare decisis to operate vertically as well—
that is, such that the lower courts must adhere to the binding 
regime the Supreme Court adopts.21 It could hardly be other-
 
 18. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpreta-
tion As Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353–54 (1990). 
 19. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 6 (listing many such canons and pre-
sumptions). 
 20. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
45 (1984); see Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 986 (2005) (―Chevron established a familiar two-step procedure for 
evaluating whether an agency‘s interpretation of a statute is lawful.‖). 
 21. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 3, at 1869, 1884. The assumption among 
the proponents of methodological stare decisis—and probably the prevailing 
assumption more broadly, to the extent there is one—is that the Supreme 
Court has the legal authority, if it can overcome its own divisions and chooses 
to exercise that authority, to direct the inferior federal courts on matters of 
interpretive methodology. Lower courts tend not to give the question much 
thought, but they seem to agree that the Supreme Court has this power, or at 
least they do not openly protest it. See, e.g., Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. 
L.L.C., 781 F.3d 1178, 1179–80, 1182–84 (9th Cir. 2015) (treating Supreme 
Court cases as abrogating circuit precedent that had required a canon of nar-
row construction of removal-jurisdiction statutes); Elgharib v. Napolitano, 600 
F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that the court ―employ[s] a three-step 
legislative-interpretation framework established by the Supreme Court‖); 
United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 940 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (―[I]f an ambiguity lurks in the statute‘s wording, or if the stat-
ute‘s wording leads to irrational results, we are instructed by the Supreme 
Court to consult additional interpretive tools, including the statute‘s title, its 
history and purpose, and canons of construction, in an attempt to ascertain 
and give effect to Congress‘s meaning.‖); Andrews v. United States, 441 F.3d 
220, 223 (4th Cir. 2006) (observing that the Supreme Court had not interpret-
ed the provision at issue but that ―the Court did establish an important inter-
pretative method‖ for approaching the provision); PPG Indus., Inc. v. United 
States, 928 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (―The Supreme Court has in-
structed that the courts must defer to an agency‘s interpretation of the statute 
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wise, for the supposed benefits of stare decisis—predictability, 
restraint, and so on—would fail to materialize if the courts 
handling most of the cases did not join the program. 
There are plenty of questions one might raise about the de-
sirability and feasibility of methodological stare decisis,22 but 
surely one interesting and important question regarding the 
vertical operation of binding methodological precedent is how 
lower courts behave today in the absence of a formalized, self-
consciously binding law of interpretation. To the extent the Su-
 
an agency has been charged with administering provided its interpretation is 
a reasonable one.‖). The proposition that the Supreme Court has the authority 
to supervise methodology has not gone unchallenged. See Amy Coney Barrett, 
The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 387 
(2006) (raising the question whether ―the Supreme Court ha[s] the authority 
to prescribe, through adjudication, rules of statutory interpretation that all 
federal courts must observe‖); Jennifer M. Bandy, Note, Interpretive Freedom: 
A Necessary Component of Article III Judging, 61 DUKE L.J. 651 (2011) (argu-
ing that binding interpretive frameworks conflict with the inherent authority 
possessed by every federal judge). My focus in this Article is the lower federal 
courts, but whether the Supreme Court could require state courts to follow a 
particular method when interpreting federal law raises additional interesting 
questions. The answer might depend on the puzzling matter of what interpre-
tive methodology is: substance, procedure, or something else. See generally 
Gluck, supra note 3 (discussing different conceptions of the legal status of in-
terpretive methodology). Nonetheless, for purposes of this Article, we can as-
sume that the prevailing attitude is correct and that the Supreme Court in-
deed has the legal authority to direct lower courts, or at least the lower federal 
courts, on matters of interpretive method. 
 22. Some commentators have argued quite forcefully that it is not desira-
ble for the courts to attempt to regularize and solidify their practices across 
time and across different kinds of cases. E.g., Evan J. Criddle & Glen 
Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1581–
95 (2014); Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statuto-
ry Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 48 (2010). We can safely bracket 
that dispute, as the aims here are more descriptive and explanatory than 
normative. Similarly, we can set aside questions about the desirability of ver-
tical uniformity, i.e., whether it makes sense for the lower courts to use exact-
ly the same interpretive rules and methods as the Supreme Court. Several 
scholars have considered whether the distinctive institutional roles and com-
petencies of the lower federal courts and the state courts should lead them to 
employ approaches to statutory interpretation that differ somewhat from the 
U.S. Supreme Court‘s approaches. See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & 
Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1215 (2012) (exploring whether elected judges and appointed judges should 
use different methods); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: 
How To Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012) (con-
sidering the relationship between a court‘s place in the judicial hierarchy and 
interpretive methodology); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law 
Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479 (2013) (examining whether state courts with gen-
eral common law powers should diverge from federal courts with respect to 
interpretive method).  
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preme Court has a comprehensible interpretive regime and 
modifies it in perceptible ways, perhaps the lower courts al-
ready follow along as a matter of what one could call de facto 
precedent. That is the question this Article investigates at 
some length, but it is worth setting out the expectations that 
intuition and existing knowledge might suggest. 
There are several reasons to expect that the lower courts 
would tend to follow the Supreme Court‘s methodological lead, 
where there is a discernible lead, whether or not they are re-
quired to do so by a formal system of methodological stare deci-
sis. To begin with, Supreme Court Justices and other judges 
(especially other federal judges) are members of the same pro-
fessional legal culture subject to similar internal norms. The 
judges may regard themselves as members of the same team 
engaged in the same joint effort, such that the lower courts‘ 
role is to emulate what the Supreme Court, their role model, 
would do.23 Bolstering the effect of role orientations, the fear of 
reversal might play a role in encouraging lower courts to heed 
their superiors‘ preferences, though such fear probably plays a 
smaller role with regard to interpretive methods than with re-
gard to substantive policy outcomes. Moreover, even in the ab-
sence of any conscious attempt to follow the Supreme Court‘s 
methodological trends, the lower courts might still move in 
parallel to the extent that all courts are influenced by similar 
external and contextual factors.  
Further reasons to expect lower courts to follow the Su-
preme Court‘s methodological lead come into view if one con-
siders some other features of our hierarchical judicial system. 
Lower courts are as a general matter required to obey higher 
courts, so one should expect compliance as the lower courts‘ de-
fault mode. True, one does see occasional outbursts of lower-
court defiance, but empirical testing has turned up little evi-
dence of significant non-compliance with precedent, even in 
controversial civil-liberties cases that one might expect to en-
gender conflict.24 Sara C. Benesh and Malia Reddick, for exam-
 
 23. Cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained 
Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 
1612–13 (1995) (developing a ―team‖ model of the judiciary). 
 24. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, 
The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-
Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 690 (1994) (finding, in a 
study of search-and-seizure cases, that the courts of appeals displayed a high 
degree of congruence with Supreme Court outcomes and responsiveness to the 
Court‘s changing preferences). 
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ple, found that the courts of appeals usually acceded quite 
quickly to Warren Court decisions overruling prior law, which 
is an interesting result given that one might have expected the 
Court‘s own mutability to diminish the alacrity of lower-court 
compliance.25 Moreover, even in circumstances in which the 
formal legal rule is that lower courts are not bound to follow 
their superiors—namely, when the higher court spoke in dic-
ta—lower courts tend to obey anyway.26  
For all of the above reasons, one might suspect that formal-
ly imposing vertical precedent—making methodology into real 
law that lower courts must obey—would not have great practi-
cal effect. That is, the real impediments to a more lawlike ap-
proach to interpretation throughout the hierarchy might not 
involve the formalities of stare decisis but might rather stem 
from the Court‘s own inconsistency and from the inherently 
slippery, non-lawlike nature of many interpretive rules. 
Still, we cannot just take lower-court adherence to the Su-
preme Court‘s methods for granted. Interpretive methodology 
presents some unusual possibilities for doctrinal slippages and 
deviations. As stated already, probably the leading gripe about 
the Court‘s methodology is that it is too inconsistent and un-
clear: even the most faithful agent would lack reliable guidance 
on many matters, and that faithful lower court might actually 
be misled if it took all of the Court‘s vacillating pronounce-
ments as binding. But even setting that important point aside, 
it may be that the high-profile contexts in which political scien-
tists have tended to search for non-compliance—and largely 
failed to find it—are actually the worst places to look for it. In-
stead, as recent work by Matthew Tokson suggests, one might 
do better to look for slippage with regard to lower-profile but 
more frequently encountered matters, often involving litigation 
procedure, because such matters involve ingrained judicial hab-
its, may have significant effects on judicial workload, and can 
be hard for higher courts to police.27 Although Tokson does not 
include interpretive methodology among his several case stud-
 
 25. Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analy-
sis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. 
POL. 534, 541–47 (2002). 
 26. See David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Prac-
tice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2025–26, 
2032–42 (2013) (providing empirical evidence that the holding/dictum distinc-
tion rarely affects lower-court decision making). 
 27. See Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 901, 925–30 (2015). 
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ies, it may actually provide a very good example of a field in 
which lower-court non-compliance, especially of the inertial ra-
ther than defiant sort, is a real prospect. Because judges en-
counter interpretive problems routinely, they may develop their 
own habitual approaches that can be slow to change. Even 
when the Supreme Court does establish and modify genuine 
rules, interpretation is complex and multi-factored enough that 
compliance with those rules is hard to divine, both for review-
ing courts and maybe even for the lower courts themselves. The 
focus of most players in the system will, naturally, be on the 
lower courts‘ outcomes rather than their reasoning. Moreover, 
depending on the content of the Supreme Court‘s interpretive 
guidance, following the Court‘s rules could entail substantial 
additional work, which again provides a reason even for faith-
ful agents to drag their feet. 
In sum, although we have plenty of reason to expect that 
lower courts will, in the main, act as good-faith implementers 
of perceptible directions, we should not simply assume that the 
Supreme Court‘s messages about the interpretive regime will 
successfully propagate through the judicial system. Investigat-
ing the success of such inter-judicial communications, and the 
factors that may aid or hinder that success, is the aim of the 
rest of this Article. 
C. A NOTE ON THE SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES AND THE  
INFERENCES THEY SUPPORT 
A note on this Article‘s methodology is appropriate before 
proceeding further. The next several parts of the Article con-
sider various instances of interpretive change. The examples 
involve different kinds of canons (textual, substantive, and oth-
er) and different kinds of changes (including gradual shifts in 
the prevalence of certain canons, sudden shifts in a canon‘s 
meaning, and the arrival of new canons). I did not attempt to 
catalogue and study the whole universe of prior and ongoing in-
terpretive shifts, nor can one realistically claim to assemble a 
―representative‖ sample when one is dealing with such a com-
plex and multifarious thing. Given the exploratory nature of 
this project, I have instead chosen a varied but admittedly non-
comprehensive set of examples. No single episode or piece of ev-
idence can answer every question, but examining a variety of 
episodes using different methods can illustrate some important 
features of interpretive change and reveal an interesting range 
of lower-court reactions. One consideration in selecting exam-
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ples and choosing measurement techniques was how readily 
and reliably a particular canon or episode could be studied. For 
some canons, the Supreme Court‘s own erratic behavior or fea-
tures of the canon itself make it hard to know what one should 
expect even perfect lower courts to do. Regarding measurement 
techniques, studying changes in citation rates of various can-
ons (which I do in some cases) or changes in courts‘ statements 
about the meaning or validity of canons (which I do in other 
cases) are more tractable forms of investigation than attempt-
ing to directly determine whether a canon has gained or lost 
outcome-affecting force.  
A note on the tenability of causal conclusions is in order as 
well. It is valuable to know how the interpretive practices of 
different courts compare, but it is more valuable still if one can 
determine whether and how cross-court influence occurs. If the 
interpretive practices of the Supreme Court and lower courts 
tend to move in parallel, that could show the existence of influ-
ence (presumably in the top-down direction). Alternatively, 
parallel conduct could merely reflect the simultaneous but in-
dependent effect of external forces (attorney behavior, evolving 
legal culture, etc.). In some of the instances that follow, the cir-
cumstances make it easy to detect the Supreme Court‘s influ-
ence on lower courts. In other instances, it will be hard to rule 
out external factors as predominant causes. In still others, one 
observes divergences between different courts‘ interpretive 
practices, which shows at least some weakness in some part of 
the mechanism by which change is transmitted through the 
system. By comparing and contrasting the lower courts‘ re-
sponses to various instances of interpretive change, one can 
tentatively identify factors that might have generalizable ef-
fects. 
II.  LARGE-SCALE TRENDS   
The interpretive regime of the Supreme Court has not been 
static over time. Interpretive approaches wax and wane; par-
ticular rules rise and recede.28 According to some accounts, a 
 
 28. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 109, 127 & n.84 (2010) (citing examples of substantive canons 
that evolved over time); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1989–90 (2005) (observing that ―the particulars of 
even longstanding canons drift over time‖ and that ―the Court occasionally 
creates new canons‖); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 181–87 (2001) (providing examples of cyclical changes 
in interpretive methodology). See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN 
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key shift in interpretive mindset occurred early in the Nation‘s 
history, as courts turned away from an older tradition of equi-
table interpretation in favor of an approach that emphasized 
the judiciary‘s duty to serve as the legislature‘s ―faithful 
agent.‖29 Moving forward to more recent times, the twentieth 
century saw the Supreme Court‘s reliance on legislative history 
increase at first and then drop off toward the end.30 Other 
changes are quicker and more discrete than those gradual 
shifts. In the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, the Court 
created or seriously strengthened several federalism and state-
immunity canons.31 And for a very recent example, which 
shows that the interpretive toolkit continues to evolve, just a 
few years ago the Court altered the standards governing judi-
cial deference to Treasury regulations.32  
The existence of shifts in interpretive methods leads to a 
variety of important questions, such as whether the lower 
courts‘ interpretive practices tend to move in parallel with the 
Supreme Court‘s practices, whether any such parallel behav-
iors are causally related, and how any such causal mechanism 
 
COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999) 
(providing a sweeping history of American statutory interpretation from its 
English roots to the present age). 
 29. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 78–105 (2001) (tracing the decline of the interpretive doc-
trine of the ―equity of the statute‖ in the early Republic). 
 30. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Leg-
islative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and 
Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 222 (2006) (noting significant decline in 
the Supreme Court‘s use of legislative history from the Burger to the 
Rehnquist Courts); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance 
on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 369, 384–86 (1999) (documenting trends in citations to legislative his-
tory from 1980 to 1998); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: 
The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1653, 1715–16, 1725 (2010) (documenting decline in the Supreme Court‘s cita-
tions to legislative history in recent decades); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan 
and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the 
Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266 (2013) (tracing and 
explaining the normalization of the use of legislative history on the Supreme 
Court in the mid-twentieth century); Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: 
Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1942–46 (2005) (tracking use 
of legislative history in tax cases over most of the twentieth century). 
 31. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional 
Law: Clear Statement Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
593, 619–29 (1992); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 477–78 (1991) 
(White, J., concurring) (complaining about the majority‘s creation of a federal-
ism ―plain statement‖ rule). 
 32. See infra Part III. 
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operates. This Part investigates correspondences at the level of 
large-scale, gradual trends. The following Parts then consider 
the lower courts‘ responses to more discrete, quicker methodo-
logical changes. 
Regarding the large-scale trends, the existing research 
suggests that the lower courts‘ patterns of behavior do reflect—
in a loose way—patterns in the Supreme Court. To date, the 
most comprehensive examination of macro-level trends in low-
er-court methodology is that performed by Frank Cross. He 
showed, using concededly imperfect measures, that in the early 
1990s the federal courts of appeals started referring to legisla-
tive history much less and textualist principles and linguistic 
canons much more.33 That shift in the lower courts roughly cor-
responds to trends in the Supreme Court, where reliance on 
textual and substantive canons was increasing and legislative 
history was in relative retreat.34 In addition, recent work on 
federal courts‘ citations of dictionaries finds that the Supreme 
Court and the courts of appeals have both increased their use 
of dictionaries in recent decades, though the increase in the 
Supreme Court has been much larger and sharper.35  
In this portion of the Article, I present some new evidence 
that bolsters and extends the prior research. One could study 
any number of interpretive tools, but for present purposes I 
have chosen to track courts‘ use, over four decades, of several 
prominent linguistic canons of word association and grammar. 
An example is ejusdem generis, the maxim providing that a 
general phrase at the end of a list is limited to instances of the 
same type as those specifically mentioned, such that ―other ve-
hicles‖ in a statutory provision referring to ―cars, trucks, and 
other vehicles‖ would more likely include motorcycles than 
 
 33. CROSS, supra note 4, at 183–91. Cross‘s method involved running 
Westlaw searches for terms like ―legislative history‖ and ―ejusdem generis‖ 
and tallying West Key Number codes related to interpretive principles like the 
―whole act‖ rule. Id.  
 34. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and 
the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29–36 (2005) 
(tracing the Supreme Court‘s use of canons in labor and employment cases 
from 1969–2002); supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the declin-
ing role of legislative history in the Supreme Court). 
 35. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Dictionaries 2.0: Exploring the 
Gap Between the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 125 YALE L.J.  
F. 104, 105, 108–09 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/dictionaries 
-2.0-exploring-the-gap-between-the-supreme-court-and-courts-of-appeals; John 
Calhoun, Note, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court 
and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L.J. 484, 502 (2014). 
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trains or bicycles.36 When one wants to study a large number of 
cases over a long period, the task is significantly simpler when 
one can rely on electronic word searches rather than individu-
ally reading many potential target cases. Many linguistic can-
ons are good subjects for study in this regard because there is a 
relatively close association between the interpretive rule and 
the name for it. As a result, one can run searches that avoid 
both too many false positives and too many false negatives. 
The figures below show citations of four well-established 
linguistic canons—namely, ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis, 
expressio unius, and the rule of the last antecedent (together 
with a few variant spellings and phrasings)—as applied to 
questions of statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court and 
the federal courts of appeals for the forty-year period 1975 
through 2014.37 My strategy resembles that used by Cross, but 
I employ a somewhat improved (though still imperfect) ap-
proach.38 I also add almost a decade of new data for the courts 
 
 36. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
74 (2007). 
 37. The primary search, run in WestlawNext‘s Supreme Court and federal 
courts of appeals databases, was: 
adv: OP((expressio or expresio or inclusio or ―last antecedent‖ or 
―noscitur a sociis‖ or ―ejusdem generis‖) /p (statut! or act or legislat! 
or congress! or ―U.S.C.‖)). 
The ―adv‖ prefix indicates that one is conducting a ―terms and connectors‖ 
search as one would do in the old Westlaw system, as opposed to using the 
fuzzier search algorithms employed by default in the new WestlawNext sys-
tem. The ―OP‖ field restriction limits the search to the court-created opinions, 
excluding material in West‘s Key Number topic descriptions and headnotes 
(which I worried would introduce more error and cross-period variation). The 
restriction at the end of the search was meant to limit the results to uses of 
the canons in statutory interpretation as opposed to other contexts such as 
contract interpretation. There are in fact quite a number of canon-citing con-
tract cases, especially insurance cases, and so I believe that using this limita-
tion makes for a better search overall, even though it falsely excludes some 
statutory cases. Similarly, because my search terms focus on the names of the 
canons rather than trying to find other language that captures the idea behind 
them, the raw numbers reported by the search understate the true number of 
canon invocations. Although my search is accordingly imperfect, the impreci-
sions should not distort the patterns over time. Note that the results were lim-
ited to published opinions, for the reasons discussed below. See infra notes 43–
47 and accompanying text. In addition to the combined search, I also ran 
searches for each canon individually. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 38. My approach differs from Cross‘s in several ways: First, I include a 
measure that attempts to roughly capture rates of citation as well as raw 
counts. Second, my search terms exclude material supplied by West, such as 
headnotes, and limit the results to cases using the canons in the statutory in-
terpretation context (versus other contexts such as the interpretation of insur-
ance contracts, wills, etc.). See supra note 37. Third, I include only published 
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of appeals (his data ended with 2005), and I add some more di-
rectly comparable data on the Supreme Court‘s use of the can-
ons. (The federal district courts are not included in this analy-
sis because they are difficult to study in a systematic way 
through electronic databases.39) 
Every research strategy has strengths and weaknesses. 
One potential limitation of my approach is that it tracks canon 
citations without attempting to determine the citations‘ im-
portance to ultimate case outcomes. In particular, my results 
do not distinguish between citations that follow the result a 
linguistic canon suggests and those that acknowledge a canon 
but then do not follow it. The justification for this approach is 
that citations of a canon are independently meaningful; they 
reflect the canon‘s prominence in the interpretive culture of the 
day. Further, whatever weaknesses this approach might have 
in other contexts, it is especially appropriate for study of the 
linguistic canons. A decision that cites a linguistic canon but 
finds it outweighed by other considerations is not really a ―neg-
ative‖ citation. One could not necessarily say the same thing 
about all other interpretive canons and sources. Regarding dis-
cussions of inferences from legislative inaction, for example, 
one might expect more references to be genuinely negative in 
the sense that they question the appropriateness of inferring 
meaning from silence.40 This provides another reason the lin-
guistic canons are good test subjects for large-scale study. 
 Figure 1 presents data for the courts of appeals. The light-
er-shaded data series shows the number of cases that cite one 
or more of the selected linguistic canons, and the darker-
shaded data series reflects an adjusted citation rate calculated 
as described below. For each data series, the jagged line reflects 
each year‘s observation and the smoother curve represents a 
trendline that evens out some of the fluctuations in the annual 
data so as to aid visualization.41 
 
opinions. (One can do this by using the ―reported‖ checkbox on the 
WestlawNext results screen.) Although Cross‘s book is not explicit on this 
point, I believe he includes unpublished cases. (The figures are usually similar 
whether or not one includes unpublished opinions, as the large majority of 
these canon-citing cases are published.) Fourth, I have added the ―rule of the 
last antecedent‖ to the three linguistic canons Cross used. 
 39. See Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District 
Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973, 982–87 (2008) (explaining that much of the work 
of the district courts is missing from Lexis and Westlaw). 
 40. E.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 
2426–27 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 41. The smoothed trendlines in the figures were generated using a LO-
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Figure 1: Use of Linguistic Canons in the Courts of Ap-
peals, Published Cases 1975–2014 
  
Caseloads and docket compositions are not constant over 
time, which raises the possibility that the increase in the num-
ber of canon citations merely reflects the increased opportuni-
ties for canon citation that come along with larger dockets. I 
have taken that possibility into account and have corrected for 
it in two ways. First, to try to contain the role of docket growth, 
as well as to guard against serious cross-temporal and cross-
court discrepancies in how many unpublished decisions made 
their way into West‘s electronic databases over the study peri-
od,43 the results shown above reflect only published opinions. 
(As it happens, the large majority of the cases using the canons 
to interpret statutes are published,44 which is not especially 
 
ESS (local regression) plug-in for Excel, with the smoothing parameter α set to 
0.33. 
 43. Different circuits began making the full text of their unpublished 
opinions available to electronic databases at different times. See Andrew T. 
Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for Ethical 
Problems & Legal Malpractice?, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 205–15 (2007). There-
fore, even setting aside the increase in the number of actual unpublished deci-
sions issued by the courts of appeals, the number available on Westlaw in-
creases during the period under study as more courts made their unpublished 
decisions available.  
 44. Even in recent years, in which there are many unpublished opinions 
and the bulk of them can be found on Westlaw, around 90% of the cases citing 
the linguistic canons at issue here are published.  
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surprising if one considers that unpublished decisions are 
mostly intended for cases that are clearly controlled by binding 
precedent.45) Unpublished opinions sharply increased in num-
ber during the study period as a response to rising appellate 
caseloads.46 But published opinions, which are always easily 
searchable, were somewhat steadier in number over the rele-
vant time horizon. In fact, the period of increasing canon use 
beginning in the late 1980s and continuing to the present actu-
ally corresponds to a period of declining numbers of published 
opinions.47  
Second, as a precaution against changes in docket composi-
tion over time, I calculated an ―adjusted rate‖ of canon citation, 
illustrated by the darker lines in Figure 1, which attempts to 
measure the cases citing the relevant linguistic canons as a 
proportion of the cases that meaningfully engage with matters 
of statutory interpretation.48 That denominator increased sub-
 
 45. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001) (―Cases 
decided by nonprecedential disposition generally involve facts that are mate-
rially indistinguishable from those of prior published opinions.‖). 
 46. See Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 221 (1999) (explaining that the growth of nonpublica-
tion can be explained in ―one word, the same word that describes the most se-
rious problem facing all our courts today: volume‖). Today, the traditional 
terminology of ―unpublished‖ versus ―published‖ decisions is somewhat inapt, 
as even many ―unpublished‖ (i.e., designated by the court as non-precedential) 
decisions of the federal courts of appeals are now printed in an actual book, 
West‘s Federal Appendix. 
 47. Here are annual figures on published opinions in the federal courts of 
appeals, at four-year intervals, with the numbers of opinions rounded to the 
nearest hundred:  
1989: 6800     2005: 5400 
1993: 6700     2009: 5000 
1997: 6100     2013: 4100  
2001: 5500 
The sources for these figures are Table S-3 (or S-5, for 1989) in the annual Ju-
dicial Business reports published by the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts. 1993 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 176 tbl.S-3; 1989 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 109 tbl.S-5; Judicial Business 
of the United States Courts, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts (click 
on the ―Judicial Business‖ link for the appropriate year; then scroll down to 
―Table S-3‖ and click ―Download‖ for years 1997–2009 data; click on the ―Judi-
cial Business 2013‖ link; then click on ―Judicial Business 2013 Tables‖ on the 
right; then scroll down to ―Table S-3‖ and click ―Download‖ for 2013 data) (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2015). Note that the reporting years for the Administrative Of-
fice do not correspond to calendar years. For example, the 2013 data reflect 
the twelve-month period that ended September 30, 2013. 
 48. There is no very good way to determine how many cases decided by 
the courts of appeals involve statutory interpretation. There are official gov-
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stantially during the first decade of the dataset, which initially 
decreased the citation rate, but the denominator held fairly 
steady after that, which explains why the citations counts and 
the citation rate move together quite closely beginning in the 
late 1980s. The behavior of the adjusted rate suggests that the 
late-80s increase in citations was not driven primarily by in-
creased opportunities for courts to engage in statutory inter-
pretation.  
The data reflected in Figure 1 support several observa-
tions. Most importantly, and consistent with Cross‘s findings, 
one sees the linguistic canons becoming more prevalent in the 
courts of appeals in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The courts 
of appeals cited the linguistic canons in greater raw numbers, 
and a larger proportion of their cases involving statutory inter-
pretation cited the linguistic canons. Further reason to be con-
fident that the data reveal actual changes in interpretive prac-
tices—as opposed to reflecting mere docket effects—comes from 
Cross‘s finding, mentioned above,49 that the courts of appeals 
began citing legislative history less at about the same time 
they started using the linguistic canons more. Finally, I note 
that although Figure 1 shows the results of a combined search 
for all four of the targeted canons, I also collected data on each 
separately. Some canons varied more than others, and the 
smaller numbers that result from disaggregating the canons 
make it harder to separate trends from noise, but the overall 
results are not attributable to any particular outlier canon.50 
 
ernment statistics that track appeals by type (e.g., diversity cases, employ-
ment discrimination, criminal sentencing, and so forth), but the fact that a 
case is based on a statutory claim does not mean that the case involves statu-
tory interpretation in any serious way (as opposed to involving the sufficiency 
of the evidence, the application of settled law to particular facts, the exercise 
of judicial sentencing discretion, and the like). My approach here, which ad-
mittedly generates only a rough measure, was to use a WestlawNext word 
search that was designed to find cases that deal with statutory interpretation 
per se. The precise terms were: adv: OP((statut! or legislat! or ―act of con-
gress‖) /s (interpret! or constru!)). The OP restrictor (i.e., ―opinion‖) excludes 
the portions of the decisions supplied by West, such as topic key numbers and 
headnotes; I worried that West‘s practices might be inconsistent over time. 
The above search provided a denominator by which one could divide the annu-
al raw citation counts to generate a proportion. Needless to say, different de-
nominators would generate different proportions, so it would be inappropriate 
to make a strong claim about the absolute level of canon usage (e.g., ―Four 
percent of the statutory interpretation cases in the courts of appeals cite one of 
these four linguistic canons.‖). But the point is to provide a measure that can 
roughly adjust for shifting dockets over time, which this should do. 
 49. See supra text accompanying note 33 (discussing Cross‘s findings). 
 50. The behavior of the lowest-frequency member of this set of canons, the 
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What caused the shift in the courts of appeals‘ citation pat-
terns? One appealing hypothesis is that the lower courts were 
following the Supreme Court‘s lead. It may be impossible to an-
swer the causal question with certainty, but we can at least 
begin the discussion by examining the patterns in the Supreme 
Court to see how they compare. Figure 2, accordingly, provides 
data on citations of the selected linguistic canons by the Su-
preme Court. 
 
Figure 2: Use of Linguistic Canons in the Supreme 
Court, 1975–2014 
  
 Although the small numbers involved can generate severe 
swings from year to year, Figure 2 nonetheless shows that the 
Supreme Court started citing the linguistic canons more often 
in the late 1980s. The Court‘s merits docket was famously 
shrinking over much of the period being studied—there was a 
drop of roughly 50% from the beginning of the period to the 
end51—which makes it important to adjust for the contracting 
docket, or, better still, to adjust for the number of statutory 
cases per year. The darker data series in Figure 2 makes such 
an adjustment; for the sake of consistency, the approach to cal-
 
rule of the last antecedent, is considered in greater detail below. See infra Part 
V.B. 
 51. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 89–90 
(5th ed. 2012). 
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culating the adjusted rate is the same one used in Figure 1. 
The rate of canon citation has increased more sharply than 
have the raw numbers. It is not clear to me whether the more 
important measure, in terms of how the lower courts perceive 
the Supreme Court’s practices, is the raw number of citations or 
the rate of citations. My sense is that frequency of canon use in 
either sense is quite hard for lower courts to pick up on, a point 
to which I return later.52  
If one compares Figures 1 and 2 above, one sees a rough 
correspondence in trends. In particular, both courts started cit-
ing the linguistic canons more around the late 1980s or early 
1990s. (Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court, notably, in 
September 1986.) Perhaps another upswing in use of linguistic 
canons is underway today, though it is hard to say without an-
other few years of data.  
What explains this correspondence? Whether the lower 
courts were influenced by the Supreme Court‘s actual or per-
ceived interpretive practices is hard to determine with certain-
ty, but the timing of the lower courts‘ shift naturally suggests 
that possibility. Further reason to suspect influence comes from 
the fact that the correlation between the two data series in-
creases if one offsets them by a few years, such that the lower-
court data is matched with Supreme Court data from a few 
years before. The lower courts often say that they regard the 
Supreme Court as their model on matters of interpretive meth-
od,53 and one would expect the lower courts to notice if the Su-
preme Court became more textualist generally and canon-
inclined in particular. If the Supreme Court‘s methodology 
shifted in a textualist direction regarding use of legislative his-
tory, dictionaries, and other sources besides just the canons, 
the combined effect could be more apparent to lower courts 
than would a single aspect alone.  
A related possibility is that the lower courts were influ-
enced, but not by changes in the actual practices of the Su-
preme Court—which might be rather difficult to discern with 
much precision—so much as by broader developments in the 
law, legal culture, and institutional context. These influences 
would include the aggressive public campaign against legisla-
tive intent waged by Justice Scalia and his textualist com-
rades54 and, more generally, the late-twentieth-century burst of 
 
 52. See infra Parts V, VII.A. 
 53. See supra note 21. 
 54. See Marty Lederman, Textualism? Purposivism? The Chief Justice 
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conservative legal theorizing about interpretive matters in the 
judiciary, the academy, and the executive branch.55 
A few other potential explanations for the lower courts‘ 
shifting citation patterns should be mentioned, though they do 
not fit the data as well. One such hypothesis is that the meth-
odological shift in the lower courts was the result of the chang-
ing ideological composition of the lower courts, with Republican 
appointees being more inclined toward textualism. But that 
explanation does not fit the pattern well, as the periods of in-
creasingly Republican courts of appeals do not match the peri-
ods of increasing textualism.56  
Another initially appealing hypothesis is that the shift to-
ward textual canons is attributable to the Chevron doctrine, 
which was also gathering strength in the lower courts at 
around the same time as the observed increase in use of textual 
canons.57 According to one understanding of the Chevron doc-
trine, the doctrine‘s first step privileges textual analysis over 
other modes of inquiry,58 which could lead courts reviewing 
agency action to use textual canons more. Without denying that 
Chevron could play some role, it does not provide a complete 
explanation. For one thing, the pattern in the data persists 
even if one excludes from the count any case that cites Chevron. 
Further, the text-only approach to Chevron‘s first step—which 
still has not clearly won out today—does not describe a settled 
approach to Chevron that prevailed twenty-five years ago, 
 
Comes down on the Side of Interpretive Pragmatism, SLATE (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/
2015/scotus_roundup/supreme_court_2015_john_roberts_ruling_in_king_v_ 
burwell.html (discussing how the textualist campaign led by Justice Scalia 
has had a ―profound‖ effect on how litigants present their cases and may have 
meaningfully influenced lower courts). That public campaign continues, most 
recently in the form of the Scalia/Garner treatise. See ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
(2012).  
 55. Recall, for instance, that the Department of Justice produced an influ-
ential report criticizing legislative history in the late 1980s. See OFFICE OF 
LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION i, v (1989). 
 56. See CROSS, supra note 4, at 185–86.  
 57. See infra text accompanying notes 176–186 (discussing the rise of the 
Chevron doctrine). 
 58. See Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL 
AGENCIES 55, 57–58, 63–71 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (con-
trasting traditional and textualist approaches to step one). 
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which is when the increase in canon use occurred.59 Put differ-
ently, methodology in Chevron cases is an important front in 
the broader textualist campaign,60 but Chevron probably did 
not cause the uptick in use of textual canons. 
When dealing with a long-term, broad-based shift in inter-
pretive predispositions such as the one described above, one 
has to acknowledge that the causal relationships can be com-
plex and uncertain. Some of the episodes of interpretive change 
discussed later in the Article will be simpler and will allow for 
firmer causal inferences. 
A final note about the correspondences observed above: 
The fact that large-scale interpretive trends in the Supreme 
Court and the lower courts tend to move together over time 
does not necessarily mean that decision making in statutory 
cases at different levels of the judicial hierarchy looks the same 
in some absolute sense. (To analogize, the moods of a boss and 
an employee might move up or down in parallel and yet one 
could be much happier in absolute terms than the other.) On 
the contrary, the figures above reveal at least one important 
difference in interpretive approaches across courts. The num-
ber of published opinions issued by the courts of appeals every 
year is around fifty to seventy-five times larger than the num-
ber of decisions issued by the Supreme Court.61 If both levels of 
the judiciary used the linguistic canons at about the same rate, 
then one would find roughly fifty to seventy-five more canon 
invocations in the courts of appeals than in the Supreme Court. 
But instead, as one can see from the figures above, the number 
of canon invocations in published opinions of the courts of ap-
peals in any given year is, very roughly, only about ten times 
greater than the corresponding number in the Supreme Court. 
That means that the rate of canon use in Supreme Court opin-
ions is substantially higher than the rate in the courts of ap-
peals. (And this comparison ignores the large number of un-
published decisions, which use the canons relatively rarely.62 
Including them would widen the disparity in rates of use.)  
 
 59. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 11, at 823–24 (describing 
continuing disagreement in the Supreme Court and lower courts over the role 
of legislative history in Chevron analysis). 
 60. See Garrett, supra note 58, at 64–65 (discussing how textualism has 
influenced the Chevron doctrine). 
 61. See supra notes 47, 51 (providing docket figures for the Supreme 
Court and courts of appeals). 
 62. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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The disparity remains, though its magnitude shrinks, if 
one adjusts for differences in docket composition. A sizable 
fraction of Supreme Court cases involve debatable questions of 
statutory interpretation, but the courts of appeals confront 
many cases without much of a statutory-interpretive compo-
nent: cases in which criminal defendants challenge the suffi-
ciency of the evidence and the reasonableness of their sentenc-
es, cases concerning whether particular facts satisfy well-
established doctrinal tests, diversity cases involving state 
common law, and so on. Recall that the darker lines in Figures 
1 and 2 above represent an adjusted rate of canon citations 
measured as a proportion of cases discussing statutory inter-
pretation.63 Citation rates have increased in both the Supreme 
Court and the courts of appeals since the mid-1980s, but while 
the rate in the courts of appeals roughly doubled since then, 
the rate in the Supreme Court increased more sharply.64 The 
adjusted rate of citation in the Supreme Court is now around 
twice as high as the rate in the courts of appeals. (It is hard to 
quantify the difference very precisely given the swings in the 
Supreme Court data.)  
This cross-court disparity in rates of canon use is not espe-
cially surprising. Even if one considers just the subset of cases 
presenting questions of statutory interpretation, citation rates 
for many or even most canons should bump up against a sort of 
ceiling in the lower courts. One important reason is that anoth-
er source of guidance, namely precedent, looms much larger as 
one moves down the appellate system. If a case is controlled by 
Supreme Court or circuit precedent, directly or by analogy, 
then there is little room for independent interpretation in the 
lower courts. Further, a higher proportion of lower-court cases 
are relatively easy in the sense that a plain textual analysis 
yields a sensible result that requires no further inquiry. The 
canons, legislative history, and other interpretive tools are 
more relevant when a court is addressing a close question on 
essentially a blank slate, which is characteristic of many Su-
preme Court cases but few cases in lower courts. 
 
 63. See supra note 48. 
 64. Calhoun‘s recent study of dictionary citations reveals a roughly simi-
lar pattern: the Supreme Court‘s citations of dictionaries rose sharply and 
substantially after the mid-80s, but the increase in the lower courts was more 
subtle; as a result, the Supreme Court‘s rate of dictionary usage is now much 
higher than the courts of appeals‘ rate. Calhoun, supra note 35, at 492, 502, 
507.  
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Another factor that may contribute to disparities in cita-
tion rates is that Supreme Court opinions tend to differ in writ-
ing style from opinions in the courts of appeals, even the pub-
lished subset of the latter. As befits a court with plenty of 
resources and a shrinking, self-selected docket, the Supreme 
Court‘s decisions are long and exhaustive and frequently fea-
ture dueling opinions that must respond to each other,65 all of 
which multiplies the arguments and canons mentioned. If a 
canon can be used, it probably will be. All of that is less true in 
the lower courts. 
III.  QUICK CANONS   
Tracing broad-based, gradual changes such as the textual-
ism shift discussed above is valuable, but it certainly does not 
tell us everything we would want to know about how the lower 
courts respond to changes in the interpretive regime. Shifts 
like those discussed above involve complicated causal explana-
tions, and large-scale correspondences can mask particular 
cases of divergence. Therefore, it may be more interesting and 
informative, and one might find some more surprises, if one 
engages in a more fine-grained analysis of particular changes 
in the Supreme Court‘s interpretive regime. Interpretive 
change does not happen only gradually and in broad terms; 
some changes can be quick or specific or both, as when the Su-
preme Court creates a new canon or modifies or abrogates an 
old one. Such events allow us to observe how the lower courts 
respond, if they respond at all, and they might help us under-
stand why some changes are more readily communicated 
through the judicial system than others. 
Beginning in this Part of the Article and continuing in the 
next several Parts, I describe a number of discrete examples of 
interpretive change. I begin in this Part with an example of a 
shift that the lower courts rapidly assimilated, and then the fol-
lowing parts turn to instances in which the lower courts have 
either lagged behind the Supreme Court, jumped out ahead of 
it, or otherwise failed to closely follow its moves. 
The lower courts have the capacity to respond to a change 
in the interpretive regime with extreme speed. Occasions to do 
 
 65. See Bruhl, supra note 22, at 477–79, 484–85 (discussing the style of 
Supreme Court opinions); see also Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?  
abstract_id=2549248 (discussing the phenomenon of dueling invocations of 
canons). 
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so are fairly infrequent, as it is not every day that the Supreme 
Court makes clear, sharp, and definitive breaks in matters of 
methodology. But an excellent occasion to observe lower-court 
responsiveness came just a few years ago, when the Supreme 
Court changed the deference regime governing the Treasury‘s 
interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code. Lower courts 
grasped the significance of the change almost immediately. 
To begin with a bit of background: When a court considers 
an agency‘s interpretation of a statute the agency administers, 
the court generally affords the agency‘s view a degree of defer-
ence in the sense that the court will acquiesce in a reasonable 
agency interpretation even if the court, exercising its own inde-
pendent judgment, would have chosen a different interpreta-
tion. Easily the most famous general-purpose deference regime 
is Chevron, with Skidmore playing the role of backup when 
Chevron is found inapplicable.66 But there are other deference 
regimes too, some of which apply to specific fields of law, such 
as national security or labor relations.67 The field of federal tax 
law has its own subject-specific deference regime, ―National 
Muffler deference.‖68 Or, rather, it used to have one: the Su-
preme Court‘s 2011 decision in Mayo Foundation for Educa-
tional and Medical Research v. Unites States abrogated Na-
tional Muffler and brought tax law into the Chevron fold.69 ―We 
see no reason,‖ Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court, ―why 
our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency 
expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review 
of other regulations.‖70 The somewhat less deferential National 
Muffler regime was repudiated, as were some other older tax 
 
 66. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see also United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (explaining when Chevron applies and when 
Skidmore applies). 
 67. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098–100 (2008) (listing various def-
erence regimes). 
 68. Nat‘l Muffler Dealers Ass‘n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
 69. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 
52–57 (2011). Some lower courts had already anticipated this move, see, e.g., 
Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm‘r, 515 F.3d 162, 167–71 (3d Cir. 2008), and 
the Supreme Court itself had been inconsistent on which deference regime it 
cited, see 562 U.S. at 53–54, so Mayo Foundation was not a total rupture with 
the past. But it brought clarity and certainty, and it did abrogate the law of a 
significant number of lower courts, namely those that had not already em-
braced Chevron. See infra note 72.  
 70. Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 56. 
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cases that did not accord with the current understanding of the 
Chevron doctrine.71 
The lower judiciary responded swiftly. Mayo Foundation 
was decided on January 11, 2011. Within weeks, one finds low-
er courts recognizing that the new decision had changed the 
applicable deference regime.72 That is quite impressive, consid-
ering the lag time between briefing, oral argument (when there 
is oral argument), and decision. Of course, finding cases that 
quickly recognize the shift tells us only one side of the story. 
Were there other courts that failed to catch on? To try to find 
out, I searched for post-Mayo Foundation lower-court cases 
that met three criteria: (1) they cited National Muffler or the 
other cases abrogated by Mayo Foundation; (2) for the standard 
of review; but (3) without citing Mayo Foundation.73 I found on-
ly one such case, though it is hardly clear that the proposition 
for which it cited National Muffler was actually incorrect in the 
wake of Mayo Foundation.74 In short, the lower courts almost 
 
 71. See id. at 56–68. 
 72. For early cases expressly noting that Mayo Foundation provided the 
governing standard of review, see, for example, Home Concrete & Supply, 
L.L.C. v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2011) (decided Feb. 7, 
2011) (Wilkinson, J., concurring), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012); Burks v. Unit-
ed States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 n.9 (5th Cir. 2011) (decided Feb. 9, 2011); Grape-
vine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(decided Mar. 11, 2011), vacated mem., 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012). It appears that 
all of the lower courts just cited had previously been in the National Muffler 
camp, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of 
Respondent at 19, Mayo Found., 562 U.S. 44 (No. 09–837), 2010 WL 3934618, 
so this is not just a case of them continuing to do what they had done before 
Mayo Foundation. 
 73. The other abrogated cases, besides National Muffler, were Rowan Cos. 
v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981), and United States v. Vogel Fertiliz-
er Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982), both of which stated that Treasury Regulations 
received less deference when they were issued pursuant to the Treasury De-
partment‘s general authority to issue rules instead of pursuant to a specific 
authorization to implement a statutory provision. For each of these three re-
pudiated cases, I used the Westlaw KeyCite feature to examine every post-
Mayo Foundation citation in order to determine whether the citations involved 
the standard of deference due Treasury Regulations and, if so, whether the 
citing case also cited Mayo Foundation. Most of the recent citations to these 
cases involve other holdings that Mayo Foundation did not address. 
 74. The case was Schwab v. Commissioner, 715 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2013), 
in which the Ninth Circuit indirectly cited National Muffler through a citation 
to a pre-Mayo Foundation Ninth Circuit case that itself cited National Muf-
fler. Here is the language at issue: ―[A]s a general matter, ‗we defer to the 
Treasury‘s interpretation of the statute‘ if the applicable regulations prove 
dispositive. See Pac. First Fed. Sav. Bank v. Comm‘r, 961 F.2d 800, 805 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (citing Nat‘l Muffler Dealers Ass‘n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 
488 (1979)).‖ 715 F.3d at 1175 (parallel citations omitted). The proposition for 
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immediately recognized that the deference landscape had 
changed, and they modified their conduct accordingly. To be 
clear, I do not claim the lower courts have always applied the 
new decision correctly in all respects—recognizing that Chevron 
applies is only part of the battle—but at a minimum they have 
realized that they are supposed to be doing something differ-
ent. 
Several features of Mayo Foundation probably contributed 
to its quick uptake, and it is useful to list them so as to facili-
tate comparisons with other episodes of canonical change. 
First, the Supreme Court‘s opinion was clear and self-conscious 
about making a change in the governing deference regime.75 
The Court knew that it was making such a change, and the de-
cision was written so as to make that intent abundantly clear 
to anyone who read it. The old precedents were not ignored or 
overruled only sub silentio; no tea-leaf reading or piecing to-
gether of footnotes was required. The opinion presents itself as 
a directive. 
Second, the content of the new directive was easy to articu-
late: Chevron now applies in the tax context; National Muffler 
and the other old cases are out. (Again, that does not necessari-
ly mean that applying Chevron will be easy or that Mayo will 
generate a substantial shift in outcomes.) One could contrast 
the clarity of this shift with another pronouncement about def-
erence that was not nearly so easy to articulate, namely the 
test announced in United States v. Mead Corp.76 Mead stated 
that Chevron applies when ―Congress delegated authority to 
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, 
and . . . the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.‖77 The Mead 
standard is ordinarily satisfied when the agency has engaged 
in notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication but 
 
which National Muffler is cited is a bit puzzling, because it seems empty, but 
it is hard to see how it is inconsistent with Mayo Foundation. Moreover, the 
dispute in the Schwab case concerned the IRS‘s interpretation of its own regu-
lation rather than the validity of the regulation as an interpretation of the 
statute. See id. at 1176 & n.11. 
 75. See Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 53, 55, 57 (―[T]he parties disagree over 
the proper framework for evaluating an ambiguous provision of the Internal 
Revenue Code. . . . The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply 
with full force in the tax context. . . . We believe Chevron and Mead, rather 
than National Muffler and Rowan, provide the appropriate framework for 
evaluating the [regulation].‖). 
 76. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 77. Id. at 226–27. 
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not when it has used less formal modes of action, and yet the 
use of any particular format is neither strictly necessary nor 
sufficient.78 The lower courts rather famously struggled to un-
derstand how Mead modified Chevron‘s deference regime and, 
soon after, what to make of Barnhart v. Walton.79 Different cir-
cuits took somewhat different approaches, and some of them 
tried to fudge the issue by saying the result is the same under 
whatever standard.80 The lower courts can hardly be blamed 
when the Supreme Court announces complicated standards 
and then offers somewhat inconsistent guidance from case to 
case.81 
In addition to the clarity of the Court‘s opinion and the 
ease of understanding the content of the new rule, a third fac-
tor that also likely aided the dissemination of the new rule in-
volves the nature of the canon involved. The various deference 
doctrines—whether Chevron, National Muffler, or something 
else—are artificial constructs that the Supreme Court creates 
and tinkers with regularly. They were different in the past, and 
they will probably change again in the future. Lower courts, at-
torneys, and others are therefore receptive to the possibility of 
change. (This point about the nature of the deference doctrines 
should become clearer later, when we contrast them with other 
canons that are not so artificial and mutable.) 
A fourth factor that likely contributed to the success of 
Mayo Foundation‘s interpretive regime change is that it in-
volved a rule applicable to a specific topic area, namely the spe-
cialized field of federal income tax, rather than a general inter-
pretive principle applicable everywhere. Some insight on the 
role of topic specificity can be found by considering the phe-
nomenon of ―agency-specific precedents‖ described by Richard 
I. Levy and Robert L. Glicksman.82 Much of administrative law, 
such as the procedural requirements for notice-and-comment 
 
 78. See id. at 229–31; Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 79. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). See generally Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005) (discussing confusion over the Court‘s shifting pro-
nouncements). 
 80. Bressman, supra note 79, at 1457–69. 
 81. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 347, 347 (2003) (suggesting that the D.C. Circuit‘s incoherent jurispru-
dence in this area is ―traceable to the flaws, fallacies, and confusions of the 
Mead decision itself‖). 
 82. Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011). 
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rulemaking or the ―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard of re-
view, is supposed to be universal default law that applies the 
same regardless of which agency is involved. But, as Levy and 
Glicksman point out, a court deciding an administrative case 
concerning some particular agency often draws its descriptions 
of the relevant universal principles from prior cases involving 
the same agency. For example, cases involving the FCC tend to 
emphasize prior FCC cases even for supposedly trans-
substantive principles such as a standard of review.83 As a re-
sult, the verbal formulations of the relevant principles, and 
perhaps the actual meaning of the principles, can become dif-
ferentiated by agency.84 Levy and Glicksman further opine that 
these ―precedential silos‖ develop partly due to attorney spe-
cialization and judges‘ rational attempts to manage decision-
making costs.85 
Related dynamics may help to explain why courts so quick-
ly picked up on the change announced in Mayo Foundation. 
Tax law has a specialized bar on both the government and tax-
payer side, and those specialists would learn of the Mayo 
Foundation decision right away through tax blogs, listservs, 
and the like.86 And because the newly applicable Chevron re-
gime should be somewhat more deferential than the previous 
regime of National Muffler,87 the attorneys at the Tax Division 
of the Department of Justice would have the incentive to advise 
courts of the new development quickly, even in cases that had 
already been briefed and argued. And, in fact, that is just what 
those attorneys did, filing post-briefing letters advising the rel-
evant courts of the change in law.88 Although Levy and Glicks-
man use their account of information costs and specialization to 
explain why a general principle can remain stuck in a prece-
dential silo and fail to diffuse into the broader precedential 
 
 83. See id. at 526–34.  
 84. Id. at 499–500. 
 85. Id. at 557–63. 
 86. See, e.g., Alan Horowitz, Supreme Court Opts for Chevron Analysis of 
Treasury Regulations, Discarding the Traditional National Muffler Dealers 
Analysis, TAX APP. BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011), http://appellatetax.com/2011/01/11/ 
supreme-court-opts-for-chevron-analysis-of-treasury-regulations-discarding 
-the-traditional-national-muffler-dealers-analysis. 
 87. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 
U.S. 44, 53–58 (2011) (distinguishing between the two standards). 
 88. For example, in Burks v. United States, the government filed a letter 
advising the Fifth Circuit of Mayo Foundation the day after Mayo Foundation 
was decided. Rule 28(j) Letter from Tax Division, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Burks 
v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2011) (No. 09-11061). 
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network, those same considerations can also help to explain 
why a case like Mayo Foundation, which was tax-specific, 
spread so rapidly within the tax silo. 
In short, several factors plausibly contributed to Mayo 
Foundation‘s quick assimilation by the lower courts: the 
Court‘s own self-consciousness about making a change, the rel-
ative simplicity of the new rule, the nature of the canon, and 
the canon‘s link to a specialized field. Of course, it is hard to 
form solid generalizations based on one case, and in any event 
generalizations are not always possible. But we have other ex-
amples that can also offer some insight on how interpretive re-
gimes evolve and propagate through the hierarchy—or, as we 
will see in the next few parts, don‘t. 
IV.  FIXED CANONS   
The example of Mayo Foundation shows the interpretive 
system at the height of its dynamic potential. The Supreme 
Court changed a canon, and the lower courts turned on a dime, 
responding instantly and accurately to the shift. This part and 
the next part of the Article consider some circumstances and 
examples in which, for various reasons, such responsiveness is 
absent. Part V will examine several instances in which the fre-
quency of canon use in the lower courts seems disconnected 
from the canons‘ use in the Supreme Court. This Part considers 
how features of certain canons limit their mutability. For cer-
tain canons, it is almost inconceivable that the Court could at-
tempt to abolish or meaningfully modify them. The Supreme 
Court would not purport to do so, and if the Court did appear to 
do so, the lower courts would not believe it. In that sense the 
meaning of some canons is fixed. 
For a noteworthy recent illustration of the static nature of 
some canons, consider Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons.89 A fed-
eral prisoner alleged that prison employees had lost or de-
stroyed some of his personal property, and he sued for damag-
es. The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the government‘s 
immunity for certain torts, but it also has many exceptions. 
The question in Ali was whether an exception regarding prop-
erty claims against ―any officer of customs or excise or any oth-
er law enforcement officer‖ included claims against literally 
any law enforcement officer, including the prison employees in-
volved in Ali.90 Although prison guards are certainly ―other law 
 
 89. 552 U.S. 214 (2008). 
 90. Id. at 216. 
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enforcement officer[s]‖ when that phrase is considered in isola-
tion, one could attempt to limit the phrase on the basis of 
ejusdem generis, the familiar linguistic canon providing that a 
general phrase at the end of a list encompasses only further in-
stances of the same type as those specifically mentioned.91 
Here, ejusdem generis would suggest that the statute encom-
passes only other officers of a type similar to those listed (i.e., 
officers involved in customs enforcement, revenue collection, 
and the like), not literally any other law enforcement officer.  
In Ali, the Supreme Court majority rejected the ejusdem 
generis argument, reasoning (in part) that this statute did not 
involve ―a list of specific items separated by commas and fol-
lowed by a general or collective term.‖92 ―The absence of a list of 
specific items,‖ the Court continued, ―undercuts the inference 
embodied in ejusdem generis that Congress remained focused 
on the common attribute when it used the catchall phrase.‖93 
Justice Kennedy‘s dissent, joined by three other Justices, 
disagreed with the result but, more interestingly, also took is-
sue with the Court‘s handling of the canon: 
[T]he Court‘s approach is incorrect as a general rule and as applied to 
the statute now before us. Both the analytic framework and the spe-
cific interpretation the Court now employs become binding on the 
federal courts, which will confront other cases in which a series of 
words operate in a clause similar to the one we consider today. So 
this case is troubling not only for the result the Court reaches but al-
so for the analysis it employs.94 
This passage is a bit puzzling. For one thing, it seems to 
give the case‘s interpretive reasoning a stricter sort of prece-
dential effect than methodology is usually thought to possess.95 
But even setting that aside, what should we think of Justice 
Kennedy‘s fears about canonical alteration? Should we expect 
the lower courts to read the majority opinion for all it is worth, 
treating it as a significant limitation on the canon‘s scope? Or 
should we expect them to shrug—or even fail to notice at all? 
For several reasons, Justice Kennedy‘s fears seem overblown.  
To begin with, ejusdem generis is a prime example of a 
practically immutable canon. The canon is deeply entrenched 
and, to a significant degree, simply reflects the context-based 
 
 91. See POPKIN, supra note 36. 
 92. Ali, 552 U.S. at 225. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 229 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 95. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (explaining that methodo-
logical decisions generally do not enjoy ordinary stare decisis effect). 
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reasoning that ordinary readers would use even if the canon 
had never existed by name. That is not to say the canon is 
strong in terms of dictating outcomes. Quite the opposite: this 
canon, like many others, is something to consider, an aid to dis-
cerning likely meaning, but it can readily be overcome by other 
considerations.96 But this weakness paradoxically contributes 
to its power. Like the reeds, it bends under the wind and 
springs back even as the mighty oak breaks.  
We might draw a contrast here to interpretive doctrines 
that are obviously artificial and contingent in the sense that 
they are self-consciously tended and calibrated by the Supreme 
Court. The various deference regimes—Chevron, Mead, and the 
rest—are the most obvious examples. No one doubts that the 
Court can and does change these rules—the Court grants certi-
orari precisely in order to do so97—and thus lower courts (and 
attorneys and other actors) are alert to the ever-present poten-
tial for change. For a canon like ejusdem generis, by contrast, 
the lower courts probably consult their own intuitive sense of 
the canon‘s gist rather than following the Supreme Court‘s lat-
est verbal formulation.  
Given the ejusdem generis canon‘s intuitive rooting and 
long pedigree, lower courts would require the strongest of evi-
dence before they would believe the canon has changed in a 
meaningful way. The majority in Ali, however, did not present 
its opinion as a major statement on the meaning of the canon. 
(Justice Kennedy in dissent is the one making that sort of 
claim.) The Court did not purport to overrule any cases; rather, 
it distinguished the situation at hand from those in which the 
canon had prevailed.98 The dissent stated that the majority 
―adopt[ed] a rule which simply bars all consideration‖ of the 
canon for statutes constructed like the one at issue in Ali.99 
More accurate than talk of ―rules‖ or ―bars‖ would be to say 
that the majority found the canon unpersuasive in the context. 
The statute deviated somewhat from the paradigm cases for 
 
 96. See, e.g., Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 89 
(1934) (―[W]hile the rule [of ejusdem generis] is a well-established and useful 
one, it is, like other canons of statutory construction, only an aid to the ascer-
tainment of the true meaning of the statute.‖). 
 97. E.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1867–68 (2013) (―We 
granted certiorari, limited to the first question presented: ‗Whether . . . a court 
should apply Chevron to . . . an agency‘s determination of its own jurisdic-
tion.‘‖ (citation omitted)); see also supra Part III (discussing the extension of 
Chevron to the tax realm). 
 98. Ali, 552 U.S. at 224–25. 
 99. Id. at 230–31 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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the application of the canon, which involve longish lists of spe-
cific items followed by a general term. The Court seemed right, 
in my estimation, to think that the argument for limiting a 
general phrase gets stronger the longer the list and the clearer 
the common theme among the items. A canon like this is not an 
on/off switch; instead, it has a core where it is powerful (though 
hardly conclusive) and a periphery in which its influence grad-
ually wanes.  
Based on the considerations in the preceding paragraphs, 
and despite the dissent‘s professed fears, it would be surprising 
to see Ali make a major change in the way lower courts use 
ejusdem generis. But we need not content ourselves with guess-
es, for enough time has passed to look for evidence. And that 
evidence shows that Ali has not seriously changed the canon. 
In the nearly eight years since Ali was decided, the Supreme 
Court has cited it as an authority on ejusdem generis just once 
(even then only in a dissent),100 and the lower courts‘ reaction 
has been modest. True, some cases cite Ali as support for hold-
ing ejusdem generis inapplicable to different statutes that are 
structurally similar to the one in Ali.101 Other cases discuss Ali 
at some length but distinguish it and apply ejusdem generis.102 
My admittedly subjective sense is that these cases could have 
made the same interpretive moves (perhaps citing something 
else) had Ali never existed. Potentially more revealing are some 
aggregate citation figures. Through the end of 2014, 383 cases 
had cited Ali, but only 11 of them (or 2.9%) include the phrase 
―ejusdem generis.‖103 This shows that Ali is mainly understood 
as a case about a particular part of the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, not a case about a canon.104 (Some cases, by contrast, do 
become cases about canons, with Chevron being the most obvi-
ous example.) Similarly, only a very small percentage of the 
 
 100. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1097 (2015) (Kagan, J., dis-
senting).  
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 634 F.3d 852, 858 (6th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Amato, 540 F.3d 153, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 
274, 292–95 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 103. This figure was derived by using the WestlawNext KeyCite feature to 
find cases citing Ali and then searching within those results for ―ejusdem gen-
eris.‖ 
 104. Ali is one of those rare cases that inspires an article about the broader 
role of the textual canons as interpretive tools. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Problem of Canonical Ambiguity in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 44 TULSA 
L. REV. 501, 502 (2009). Ali was relatively well-positioned to become a case 
about a canon, and yet the judicial response has been muted.  
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cases in the lower courts citing ejusdem generis in the years 
since Ali was decided cite Ali in any way, no matter how fleet-
ingly. The following table provides the details. 
 
Table 1: Ejusdem Generis Cases in Lower Federal Courts 
that Cite Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, by Year105 
2008: 2 cases citing Ali out of 56 cases citing ejusdem generis 
(3.6%) 
2009: 0 out of 53 (0%) 
2010: 0 out of 56 (0%) 
2011: 2 out of 44 (4.5%) 
2012: 3 out of 63 (4.8%) 
2013: 2 out of 71 (2.8%) 
2014: 1 out of 66 (1.5%) 
Total: 10 out of 409 (2.4%) 
  
 Contrary to Justice Kennedy‘s fears, then, Ali has not be-
come a major precedent about the meaning of the ejusdem gen-
eris canon, at least not yet.  
Ali‘s relative impotence is not surprising. Mayo Foundation 
had several factors working in its favor, but in Ali several simi-
lar factors cut against successful canonical change: lack of clear 
intent on the Court‘s part to make a major change, the squishy 
rather than sharp nature of the potential change, an intuitively 
rooted rather than avowedly artificial canon, and the absence 
of a specialized bar.  
Although every example may have its own peculiarities, 
some of the factors just mentioned are common to textual can-
ons generally. Textual canons often capture some of the truth 
about human expression (words derive meaning from surround-
ing words, different parts of a directive should not contradict 
themselves, the same word probably means the same thing 
when used repeatedly in proximity, etc.).106 The intuitive root-
ing of these canons makes them hard to grab onto in order to 
stretch or compress or toss aside as one desires. At the same 
time, these canons are not outcome determinative, and there-
 
 105. These figures were derived by searching the WestlawNext ALLFEDS 
database for lower-court cases containing both ―ejusdem generis‖ and ―Ali‖ for 
the given years, then searching just for ―ejusdem generis.‖ (The search for 
2008 was limited to cases decided after Ali came down.) The searches returned 
a few false positives (such as other cases or litigants named ―Ali‖), which I dis-
carded. It appears that only one state case has ever cited both ejusdem generis 
and Ali: Warren v. State, 755 S.E.2d 171, 173 n.2 (Ga. 2014). 
 106. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 54, at 51. 
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fore the exact details of their scope do not carry high stakes. 
The Supreme Court is unlikely to have much reason to wish to 
tinker with them, and lower courts would hesitate to read 
much into one decision that seems to give them more or less 
force. There is no specialized bar that lives and breathes these 
canons, and the Supreme Court does not grant certiorari just to 
opine on their meaning. Therefore, although Part II showed 
that the prevalence of textual canons in the lower courts 
changed over time, roughly tracking the patterns in the Su-
preme Court, the meaning of textual canons resists modifica-
tion. 
Some substantive canons may possess similar tendencies 
toward stasis. A number of substantive canons—such as the 
presumption against retroactivity, presumptions in favor of us-
ing various common-law doctrines as gap fillers, and so on—
reflect preferences for stable, rational law that are intuitive 
and appealing, at least to a degree; reasonable people would 
indeed hesitate before reading vague or ambiguous statutes to 
upset settled expectations and policies, especially policies 
grounded in the influence of constitutional values.107 It would 
be hard not to bring such expectations to bear regardless of 
what exactly the Supreme Court said in its latest case. Fur-
ther, although many substantive canons are tied to a particular 
field of law with an observant, specialized bar, others (such as 
those just mentioned) are not. 
In sum, many canons—and many textual canons in partic-
ular—can be expected to resist conscious modification, either 
by the Court itself or as the lower courts perceive the Court‘s 
intent. Their position is in that sense relatively static. 
V.  LOOSE CANONS (THE PROBLEM OF CANON 
PROMINENCE)   
In Part III, we saw a case in which the lower courts re-
sponded to the Supreme Court like an attentive dance partner, 
quickly and accurately picking up on a change in direction. 
Part IV has just explained that such shifts in meaning are hard 
to imagine for certain canons, whatever the Court might say 
about them. But in other instances we encounter a different 
phenomenon, neither quickness nor stasis but a certain kind of 
slack. A canon‘s standing in the lower courts need not be very 
 
 107. Cf. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 927 (1992) (observing that many canons, both lin-
guistic and substantive, reveal ―a preference for continuity over change‖). 
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tightly yoked to its prominence in the Supreme Court‘s deci-
sions. This slack can manifest itself in the form of overreac-
tions, such as when a few mentions from the Supreme Court 
bump up a canon‘s salience and then it takes off in the lower 
courts. Slack can also manifest itself in the form of un-
derreactions, such as when the lower courts are slow to notice a 
canon‘s disappearance. Let us begin there. 
A. GHOSTS AND ZOMBIES 
In the M. Night Shyamalan film The Sixth Sense, a boy can 
see dead people, ghosts of the recently departed. The twist is 
that some of the ghosts, including (spoiler alert!) the other 
main character, a child psychologist played by Bruce Willis, 
don‘t yet realize they are dead.108 
Perhaps something similar is true of some canons of inter-
pretation. Their vitality is questionable because the Supreme 
Court has not cited them in decades despite many opportuni-
ties to do so, yet these ghost canons linger on in the lower 
courts as if unaware of their own demise. Moreover, there may 
be some canons—we could call these zombie canons—that the 
Supreme Court has affirmatively tried to kill, yet still they 
stalk the pages of the Federal Reporter and Federal Supple-
ment, undead. 
The following sections discuss two canons that might fall 
into the ghost or zombie categories, but it is worth explaining 
why this discussion does not include one very famous canon, 
namely the rule of lenity, which provides that unclear penal 
statutes are construed in favor of the accused. It is true that 
some commentators, and recently Justice Scalia too, have ques-
tioned whether the rule of lenity has any force in the contempo-
rary Supreme Court.109 Yet the Court‘s treatment of the canon 
falls short of an outright repudiation or even an unspoken 
abandonment. The rule of lenity rarely carries the day, but the 
Court cites it regularly, and in fact the canon has played a sig-
nificant supporting role in a few major pro-defendant rulings in 
 
 108. THE SIXTH SENSE (Hollywood Pictures & Spyglass Entertainment 
1999). 
 109. E.g., Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2281 (2014) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (asking whether his colleagues still regard lenity as a ―genuine 
part of our jurisprudence‖); Rick Hills, Why Do I Waste My Time Teaching the 
So-Called “Rule of Lenity”?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 22, 2011, 4:28 PM),  
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/03/why-do-i-waste-my-time 
-teaching-the-so-called-rule-of-lenity.html. 
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recent years.110 Even the most attentive agent would have 
trouble reading the Court‘s signals, and it would be surprising 
to see lower courts abandon such an ancient canon without 
very clear evidence. This is not to say that the lower courts‘ 
treatment of lenity—in particular the canon‘s potential to be-
come a zombie—is unworthy of study,111 but for the present we 
should focus on the much cleaner cases presented by canons 
that the Supreme Court has abandoned or worse.  
 
1. The Slow Fade (and Nascent Transformation?) of the Civil- 
Rights Canon 
Is there a substantive canon governing the interpretation 
of civil-rights statutes, such as Title VII, Section 1983, and the 
Voting Rights Act? I have always thought that there is such a 
canon and that it provides that civil-rights statutes are to be 
broadly construed to effectuate their remedial purposes. Vari-
ous sources report such a canon,112 and it is easy to find the 
canon recited in older Supreme Court cases.113 At the same 
time, I have had the sense that this canon is not what it used to 
be, perhaps that it has slipped into disuse. There are other 
canons that the Court has also neglected of late—the old canon 
favoring Indian tribes, for example, has practically no purchase 
 
 110. E.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 410–11 (2010) (interpret-
ing the federal ―honest services‖ fraud statute); United States v. Santos, 553 
U.S. 507, 513–14 (2008) (plurality opinion) (interpreting a federal money-
laundering statute). 
 111. My sense based on some initial research is that lower courts have not 
reduced their use of the canon; if anything, it is cited more today than it was a 
decade ago. Studying the rule of lenity presents some greater challenges than 
one encounters with other canons, including major changes in docket composi-
tion, large numbers of unpublished criminal decisions, varying formulations of 
the rule, and large numbers of ―negative‖ citations of the canon (i.e., cases that 
deem it inapplicable). I hope to return to the rule of lenity in future work. 
 112. See 3B NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 76:6, at 178 (7th ed. 2011) (stat-
ing that courts ―now generally agree . . . that civil rights acts are remedial and 
should be liberally construed,‖ though also noting prior contrary authority 
(footnote omitted)); see also Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(referring to ―the oft-repeated statement that Title VII is remedial in charac-
ter and should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes‖). 
 113. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 120 (1981); Gomez 
v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 
765–66 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436 
U.S. 658, 684–86 (1978); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 
(1974). 
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on the Court today114—but the civil-rights canon provides an 
especially significant object for study because it could be cited 
in so many cases. 
To probe the intuition that the canon has been in decline in 
the Supreme Court, I ran some rather broad electronic searches 
of the Court‘s opinions and consulted the secondary literature. 
Although it is hard to speak definitively about such matters, 
given that it is sometimes debatable whether a canon is being 
invoked, it appears that the liberal-construction canon for civil 
rights no longer exists at the Supreme Court level. Probably 
the last clear invocations of the canon in Supreme Court major-
ity opinions came almost twenty-five years ago, in two 1991 
cases, Chisom v. Roemer and Dennis v. Higgins. In Chisom v. 
Roemer, which concerned the Voting Rights Act, the Court cited 
and quoted an earlier case for the proposition that the Act 
―should be interpreted in a manner that provides ‗the broadest 
possible scope‘ in combating racial discrimination.‖115 In Dennis 
v. Higgins, which concerned whether Commerce Clause chal-
lenges could be brought under Section 1983, the Court quoted 
prior admonitions that Section 1983 ―must be broadly con-
strued‖ and that its legislative history contemplates that the 
statute should be ―liberally and beneficently construed.‖116 But 
since 1991, the liberal-construction canon, which had already 
been in retreat in the preceding years, has gone silent, at least 
in the Court‘s majority opinions.117 Indeed, regarding the Vot-
ing Rights Act in particular, the most striking interpretive de-
velopment of recent years has been the development of a coun-
ter-canon restricting the statute‘s coverage so as to avoid 
federalism concerns.118 
 
 114. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 413–14 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the majority ―ignores the ‗principle deeply rooted in 
[our] Indian jurisprudence‘ that ‗statutes are to be construed liberally in favor 
of the Indians‘‖ (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of 
the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992))). 
 115. 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 
U.S. 544, 567 (1969)). 
 116. 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991) (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los An-
geles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989), and Monell, 436 U.S. at 684). 
 117. For a mention in a dissent, see, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women’s 
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 342 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 118. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202–
07 (2009) (broadly construing an exception to the Voting Rights Act‘s coverage 
in order to avoid constitutional difficulties). Those constitutional worries 
turned into a full-fledged ruling of partial unconstitutionality in Shelby Coun-
ty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621, 2631 (2013). 
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Again, it is hard to pinpoint a canon‘s time of death, and it 
is not as if a civil-rights plaintiff has not won a debatable statu-
tory interpretation case in the Supreme Court since 1991.119 
Recall that we are considering the rules and presumptions that 
the Court deploys in its reasoning rather than measuring wins 
and losses.120 Still, my judgment on the canon‘s apparent expi-
ration about twenty-five years ago does not stand alone. Ruth 
Colker, in a study of the federal courts‘ interpretations of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, likewise concludes that the 
canon met its ―demise‖ during the Rehnquist Court, with Chi-
som representing its last gasp, and that the canon has since 
been ―abandoned.‖121 The demise of the civil-rights canon is an 
aspect of the broader decline, noted by others, of various canons 
that traditionally called for the expansive interpretation of var-
ious sorts of ―remedial‖ legislation.122 
Nonetheless, although the Supreme Court has not cited the 
civil-rights canon lately, and although the thrust of the Court‘s 
jurisprudence over the last few decades has been (with excep-
tions, to be sure) generally against generous readings of anti-
discrimination laws, the Court has never abrogated the broad-
construction canon in so many words. There has been no public 
execution, just a withdrawal of sustenance. This raises the pos-
sibility that the canon might linger on in the lower courts, at 
least for a time. 
 
 119. For example, in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, the Supreme Court 
ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 includes an anti-retaliation remedy, and in doing 
so it referred to ―broadly worded civil rights statute[s].‖ 553 U.S. 442, 452 
(2008). However, it seems to me that the Court was referring to the breadth of 
the statute‘s language rather than invoking a substantive canon of liberal con-
struction of ambiguous language and, further, the Court‘s ruling in CBOCS 
West relied heavily on the stare decisis effect of an old decision rather than de 
novo interpretation. See id. at 446–52. In any event, any thought that CBOCS 
West revived the broad-construction canon would seem to have been put to 
rest in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, which re-
fused to apply CBOCS West‘s reasoning to Title VII. See 133 S. Ct. 2517, 
2529–31 (2013). 
 120. See supra Part I.A. 
 121. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 20–23 & n.98 (2007).  
 122. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 6, at 690 (―Certain statutes (such as 
civil rights, securities, and antitrust statutes) are supposed to be liberally con-
strued—in other words, applied expansively to new situations. [But] these lib-
eral construction canons have not been often invoked by the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts.‖ (footnote omitted)); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 54, 
at 364 (referring to the ―false notion that remedial statutes should be liberally 
construed‖). 
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And linger it has. The liberal-construction canon has not 
disappeared from the lower courts‘ interpretive toolkit the way 
it has vanished at the Supreme Court. Although there are some 
notable exceptions in which courts have noticed the Supreme 
Court‘s implicit rejection of the canon, for the most part the 
lower courts‘ statements about the canon do not seem to recog-
nize that anything has happened but instead continue to refer 
to it as a settled rule, even in the context of the Voting Rights 
Act.123 In a sense these lower courts are correct to rely on the 
canon, given that precedents have indefinite life and remain 
valid and citable until overruled.  
Regarding patterns of frequency of citation of the civil-
rights canon, a complicated and interesting story emerges. Fig-
ures 3 and 4 below present some rough, aggregate data regard-
ing citations of the canon in the courts of appeals.124 The fig-
ures show that the canon is in gradual decline if one considers 
the canon in what could be called its ―traditional‖ form; a newer 
form of the canon, however, is vigorous and possibly still gain-
ing strength.  
 
 
 123. E.g., Ohio State Conf. of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 553 (6th 
Cir. 2014) (―The Supreme Court has . . . held that the Voting Rights Act 
should be interpreted broadly . . . .‖); EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 
485 (5th Cir. 2014) (referring to our ―‗well recognized‘ practice of liberally con-
struing Title VII‘s requirements in light of the statute‘s remedial purpose‖ (ci-
tation omitted)); see also Padilla v. Lever, 463 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(en banc) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (referring to the rule of broadly constru-
ing the Voting Rights Act as ―well-established‖ but citing Supreme Court cases 
from the 1960s). For a perceptive exception, see Farrakhan v. Washington, 
359 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of re-
hearing en banc) (―In recent years, the [Supreme] Court has repeatedly reject-
ed broad interpretations of the VRA, obviously troubled by the constitutional 
implications.‖). 
 124. It is difficult to study the district courts systematically through elec-
tronic databases, so the discussion in the text concerns the courts of appeals. 
See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 3: Citations of the Traditional Civil-Rights Canon 
in the Courts of Appeals, 1980–2014 
 
Let me explain how this figure was derived and then set 
out a few cautions about how to interpret it.  
To produce this figure, I began with electronic database 
searches that sought to find invocations of the canon in what 
one might call its ―traditional‖ form—that is, as a rule requir-
ing liberal interpretation of ―civil rights‖ laws generally or the 
great 1960s statutes in particular.125 I then reviewed the re-
sults and counted any case in which the broad-construction 
canon was arguably invoked, even weakly, including in the 
form of quotations from prior cases, cases in which the canon 
was acknowledged but not followed, and cases in which it was 
invoked in dissent, my rationale being that such uses still show 
the canon‘s currency as a recognized tool. Consistent with the 
approach elsewhere in this Article, the figure above reflects on-
ly published opinions.126 Nonetheless, in this instance one 
 
 125. The WestlawNext search string was as follows: adv: DA(aft1979) and 
OP((―civil rights‖ or ―equal rights‖ or ―title vii‖ or ―voting rights‖ or vra) /30 
(broad! or liberal!) /5 (read! or interpret! or constru!)). This yielded over 1000 
results, the large majority of which were false positives. The most common 
false positive involved statements of the rule that courts should liberally con-
strue the pleadings of pro se litigants. Nonetheless, although this search cast 
the net broadly, it is certainly possible to invoke the liberal-construction canon 
without using the search terms above, and so the search is not fully compre-
hensive. For the meaning of the ―adv‖ prefix in the search, and for the reasons 
for using the ―OP‖ limitation, see supra note 37.  
 126. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
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might hypothesize that a downward trend in citations of the 
canon in published cases could simply mean that citations have 
―migrated‖ to unpublished cases as the relevant statutes be-
come less novel and better understood. To evaluate that hy-
pothesis, I ran the same searches on unpublished opinions. It 
appears that citations have not migrated to unpublished opin-
ions in serious numbers: only two years in the period covered 
by Figure 3 had more than one citation of the canon in an un-
published opinion. 
In terms of general caveats, any electronic search string 
will miss some cases, and judgment calls are involved in re-
viewing the results. Figure 3 can therefore be treated as illus-
trating a gradual decline trend but not as presenting an exact 
measure for any given year.  
A more specific caution about interpreting this figure con-
cerns the role of caseload, as the opportunities to cite the canon 
vary according to the number of relevant appeals. A rough 
proxy for this ―denominator‖ is the annual number of appeals 
in employment discrimination cases, a figure that has long 
been tracked by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.127 
That figure has sometimes been erratic—it nearly doubled dur-
ing the 1990s and then turned around and halved during the 
first decade of the 2000s—but despite the ups and downs the 
number ends up being similar at the beginning and end of the 
period shown in Figure 3. In sum, we can be fairly confident 
that the civil-rights canon in its traditional form is in genuine 
decline in the lower courts, though the drop has been less ex-
treme and complete than the Supreme Court‘s decades-long 
abandonment of it—a bumpy downward incline rather than a 
cliff.  
Whether the Supreme Court played a causal role in this is 
harder to say. Although lower courts surely perceive the 
Court‘s general attitude toward interpreting antidiscrimination 
 
 127. The data are reported in Table B-7 of the Administrative Office‘s an-
nual Judicial Business reports. See Judicial Business of the United States 
Courts, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis 
-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts (click on the ―Judicial Business‖ 
link for the appropriate year; then scroll down to ―Table B-7‖ and click ―Down-
load‖) (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (containing reports back to 1997). The best 
figure to use is probably the category for ―Private Civil Rights: Employment,‖ 
which notably includes Title VII cases; however, none of the case categories 
tracked by the official statistics exactly mirrors the group of cases captured by 
the electronic search.  
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legislation (i.e., generally less expansionist than in the past), 
my review of many cases does not provide much evidence of the 
lower courts expressly noting the Supreme Court‘s abandon-
ment of the canon.128 It is certainly possible that broader ideo-
logical or contextual factors simultaneously affected all the 
courts, making the whole federal judiciary less hospitable to 
broad interpretations. Further, even if the lower courts had no 
idea what the Supreme Court was up to, and even if nothing 
about the lower courts changed, it would not be wholly surpris-
ing to see a decline in canon citations over time. That is be-
cause we can conceive of statutes as having a natural lifecycle 
in which they generate many novel interpretive questions in 
their early years and fewer such questions later. Many of the 
major civil-rights laws are aging. Title VII, one of the most im-
portant, was enacted in 1964 and saw its last major amend-
ment in 1991 (which was, as it happens, largely a response to 
the Supreme Court‘s stingy interpretations in the late 
1980s).129 With an old statute, most questions will have been 
resolved by Supreme Court or circuit precedent already, which 
tends to diminish the need for interpretive sources like can-
ons.130  
One can find some contrasting results if one looks for a 
slightly different version of the civil-rights canon. There ap-
pears to be a nascent trend of increased use of the broad-
construction canon in the interpretation of a different and new-
er civil-rights law: the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA), as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
(ADAAA).131 Though admittedly the numbers are small, the 
figure below shows the recent growth of an ADA-focused vari-
 
 128. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 129. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, §§ 2–3, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071 (1991) (findings and purpose clauses); H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, at 87–88 
(1991) (criticizing the Supreme Court‘s rejection of the liberal-construction 
canon in its recent cases), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 625–26. 
 130. Cf. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 30, at 224–26 (presenting tenta-
tive evidence of a link between statutory age and declining use of legislative 
history for several statutes governing the workplace, including Title VII); Law 
& Zaring, supra note 30, at 1722–25 (showing that the Supreme Court‘s use of 
legislative history generally declined with statutory age, though usage in-
creased again once a statute became more than ninety years old). 
 131. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213). 
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ant of the broad-construction canon. Again, the details of the 
search are set out in the margin.132 Because of the small num-
bers involved in some years, the citations are grouped into five-
year baskets. In this instance I have included data on un-
published cases, because (unlike in other situations studied in 
this Article) they were a substantial portion of the total cita-
tions. 
 
Figure 4: Citations of Disability Canon in the Courts of 
Appeals, 1980–2014 
 
The pattern illustrated above likely has a few causes. Part 
of the explanation is that that ADA is a relatively young and 
still evolving statute that continues to generate interpretive 
questions. But in addition to reflecting a natural statutory 
lifecycle, this canon‘s use is also fueled by non-judicial leader-
ship: (1) the ADAAA contains its own statutory provision call-
ing for broad construction;133 and (2) the ADA‘s implementing 
regulations and other administrative guidance also contain 
broad-construction directives.134 As a result, some of the cases 
are citing those legislative and administrative directives rather 
 
 132. The search strategy was like that described above, supra note 125, ex-
cept for the substitution of ADA-related terms: adv: DA(aft1979) and OP((ADA 
or ―americans with disabilities‖ or ADAAA) /30 (broad! or liberal!) /5 (read! or 
interpret! or constru!)). As before, I reviewed the results and removed false 
positives. 
 133. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012) (―The definition of disability in this 
chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this 
chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.‖).  
 134. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (k)(2) (2015). 
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than a court-created canon. In fact, over the last decade, those 
non-judicial sources account for a substantial majority of the 
canon references and thus explain much of the canon‘s increas-
ing currency. In that sense, this canon is not directly compara-
ble to the waning traditional civil-rights canon.  
There are some interesting lessons here about the com-
plexity of interpretive change. A canon‘s role can evolve over 
time as the surrounding legal landscape changes. While the 
traditional civil-rights canon is in decline even in the lower 
courts, to some degree the canon has simply shifted ground in 
light of new circumstances. If one were to combine citations 
from the two versions of the canon, the drop shown in Figure 3 
would be significantly slowed. Further, the growth of the ADA 
canon has not been driven by the Supreme Court. The Court 
has not announced a pro-ADA canon; on the contrary, it has 
generally read the ADA narrowly.135 Indeed, dissatisfaction 
with the Court‘s stingy treatment of the ADA was part of the 
motivation for the enactment of the ADAAA,136 and that new 
statute‘s liberal-construction directive is now being cited by the 
lower courts. The story of the civil-rights canon(s) thus demon-
strates a significant degree of slack in multiple dimensions, 
with the lower courts lagging behind the Supreme Court in one 
way but leading the Supreme Court—at Congress‘s behest—in 
another. 
One very interesting question, of course, is what will hap-
pen when the Supreme Court begins to decide cases under the 
ADAAA. Will the statute‘s broad-construction interpretive di-
rective alter the Court‘s interpretive mood? Will it even be cit-
ed?  
In the civil-rights field, we encountered a canon that has 
fallen into disuse in the Supreme Court but that is still hang-
ing on in the lower courts, albeit in a weakened and now evolv-
ing form. But, as the next example shows, even negative com-
mentary from the Court might not suffice to silence a canon if 
the Supreme Court is not unequivocal and consistent. 
 
 135. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) 
(stating that the definition of disability ―need[s] to be interpreted strictly to 
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled‖); Colker, supra note 
121, at 25 (―[T]he Supreme Court has not cited [the broad-construction canon] 
once in interpreting the ADA.‖). 
 136. ADAAA § 2(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3553 (findings and purpose clauses). 
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2. The Uncertain Future of the Subject-Matter Jurisdiction  
Canon 
Is there a substantive canon governing the interpretation 
of statutes conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal 
courts? Plenty of reputable authorities say that such statutes 
are to be narrowly construed, that is, read so that uncertainty 
is resolved against federal jurisdiction.137 The lower courts re-
peat such a rule in cases both old and new.138 The rule makes 
sense, as far as substantive canons go, given that expansive 
federal jurisdiction implicates federalism concerns.139 Further, 
in the particular context of removal jurisdiction, a presumption 
in favor of state-court jurisdiction is said to gather additional 
force because of the risk that a case will be swept out of a state 
court surely having jurisdiction, proceed to judgment in a fed-
eral court lacking jurisdiction, then have to be vacated and re-
manded.140 
Despite its considerable renown, the narrow-construction 
canon is not so robust these days in the Supreme Court. When 
one examines lower-court invocations of the canon and traces 
the line of precedent back to its eventual source in the U.S. Re-
ports, one often ends up (perhaps after several layers of cita-
tions to circuit precedent) with rather old Supreme Court cases 
like Healy v. Ratta (1934)141 or Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
 
 137. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 19 (1981) (―[I]t is a canon of construc-
tion that courts strictly construe their jurisdiction.‖), as reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29; ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 6, at 1206 (citing a canon of 
―[n]arrow construction of federal court jurisdictional grants that would siphon 
cases away from state courts‖); 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3602.1, at 135 (3d ed. 2009) (―It is a familiar 
proposition that the constitutional policy of limited jurisdiction requires that 
the statutes granting subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts be strict-
ly construed.‖).  
 138. See, e.g., Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., 733 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir. 
2013); Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam); 
Russell v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 325 F.2d 996, 998 (8th Cir. 1964); Kres-
berg v. Int‘l Paper Co., 149 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1945). Note that there is a 
different rule concerning the interpretation of jurisdiction-stripping legisla-
tion; restrictions of existing jurisdiction are required to be clearly stated, espe-
cially where constitutional concerns are involved. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 298–99 (2001); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000). 
 139. See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1934); Palkow v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 554–55 (6th Cir. 2005).  
 140. See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 3721, at 66–82 (4th ed. 2009). 
 141. 292 U.S. at 270 (―The policy of the statute [setting forth a jurisdiction-
al amount] calls for its strict construction.‖).  
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Sheets (1941).142 Even though the Court frequently deals with 
questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, it is hard to find a re-
cent full-throated endorsement of the narrow-construction can-
on. In the removal context, where the canon has perhaps al-
ways been strongest, the Court in 2003 noted that a litigant 
relied on a ―federal policy of construing removal jurisdiction 
narrowly,‖ and the Court acknowledged Shamrock‘s language 
setting forth such a canon.143 The Court nonetheless went on to 
hold that there was removal jurisdiction and, significantly, to 
question the continued vitality of the narrow-construction rule 
in light of post-1941 statutory amendments to the removal 
statute.144  
Since then, the Court has continued to deemphasize the 
canon through both act and omission. In the non-removal con-
text, the Court‘s most significant encounter with the canon in 
the last decade was Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, 
Inc. (2005), which concerned the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute.145 Going into the decision, 
 
 142. 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) (―[T]he policy of the successive acts of Con-
gress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict 
construction of such legislation.‖). For an extreme example of reaching way 
back to find support for narrow construction, see Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI 
WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 301 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Turner v. Bank of 
North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799)), vacated sub nom. Verizon Md., 
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002). 
 143. Breuer v. Jim‘s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 697 (2003) 
(citing Shamrock, 313 U.S. at 108–09); see also Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. 
Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (stating that ―statutory procedures for removal 
are to be strictly construed‖ and citing four cases from the 1920s through 
1940s). 
 144. Breuer, 538 U.S. at 697–98; see also Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti 
Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 357 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (ac-
cusing the majority of ―depart[ing] from this Court‘s practice of strictly con-
struing removal and similar jurisdictional statutes‖). Citing Murphy Bros. as 
support, Moore’s Federal Practice observes that ―[r]ecent developments have 
cast some doubt on the axioms that removal is strictly construed and that a 
presumption exists against removal.‖ 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE‘S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 107.05, at 107-26 (3d ed. 2015); see also Bailey v. 
Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 2008) (also read-
ing Murphy Bros. as possibly stepping away from the canon). I am not sure 
that Murphy Bros. should have such broad significance, but I do agree with 
the general sense that the Supreme Court has been deemphasizing the canon. 
The treatise goes on to say, accurately, that ―[n]evertheless, federal courts 
continue to recite these axioms [i.e., of narrow construction].‖ MOORE ET AL., 
supra.  
 145. 545 U.S. 546 (2005). There is, obviously, some judgment being exer-
cised in determining when the Court last seriously addressed the canon. Cer-
tainly, there have been plenty of cases concerning subject-matter jurisdiction 
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the participants believed the narrow-construction canon was 
alive and well. Tellingly, both of the courts of appeals under re-
view in Exxon Mobil cited the narrow-construction rule (though 
one ultimately upheld jurisdiction and the other did not).146 
The parties opposing jurisdiction featured the narrow-
construction canon in their briefing to the Supreme Court.147 
But the Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction in both cases and, 
more importantly for present purposes, did not cite the narrow-
construction canon, even if only to find it outweighed by other 
factors. Instead, the Court said this about the governing inter-
pretive rules: 
We must not give jurisdictional statutes a more expansive interpreta-
tion than their text warrants, but it is just as important not to adopt 
an artificial construction that is narrower than what the text pro-
vides. No sound canon of interpretation requires Congress to speak 
with extraordinary clarity in order to modify the rules of federal ju-
risdiction within appropriate constitutional bounds. Ordinary princi-
ples of statutory construction apply.148  
Now, we should not make too much of this statement; per-
haps the Court was simply saying that clear statutory text 
should be obeyed, which is about the most ordinary interpretive 
principle there is. Nonetheless, given the canon‘s appearance in 
the briefing and in many prior cases, the Court‘s admonition to 
use ―ordinary principles‖ of interpretation certainly seems like 
a step back from the narrow-construction canon.149 Read liter-
 
since 2005, including some in which the Court could be said to have given a 
strict reading against jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 
209–14 (2007) (construing the period for filing an appeal as jurisdictional and 
not subject to equitable exceptions). But here we are considering reasoning 
more than outcomes; that is, we are asking whether the canon is a vital and 
acknowledged factor in the Court‘s justifications for its decisions. 
 146. The Court‘s opinion resolved two cases that had been consolidated. 
See Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 142 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(―The Supreme Court . . . has repeatedly admonished that in light of the bur-
geoning federal caseload, diversity jurisdiction must be narrowly construed.‖), 
rev’d sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 
(2005); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 362 F.3d 739, 757 (11th Cir. 
2004) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (urging the Su-
preme Court ―to give guidance in applying the ‗substantive‘ canons of statuto-
ry construction . . . includ[ing] the directive to construe jurisdictional grants 
narrowly‖ (citation omitted)). 
 147. Brief of Petitioner at 12, Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. 546 (No. 04-70), 2004 
WL 2812088; Brief for Respondent at 36, Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. 546 (No. 04-
79), 2005 WL 139840. 
 148. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 558 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 149. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Statutory Interpretation in the Context of Fed-
eral Jurisdiction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 52, 86 (2007) (―Although some prior 
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ally, the passage above could be taken as an abrogation of the 
canon: use ―ordinary principles,‖ with no thumb on the scales in 
either direction. The Supreme Court itself has not offered clari-
fication, as it has not subsequently cited Exxon Mobil for any 
proposition related to the status of the canon. But the Court 
has not relied on the canon in the ensuing years, though cer-
tainly the Court could have used it in later cases if it wished. 
Although I do not feel that it is possible to present solid 
numerical data on the prevalence of this canon in the lower 
courts during different time periods,150 my sense is that the 
lower courts‘ response to the canonical-methodological devel-
opments just described has been muted. To be sure, the pas-
sage quoted above has not gone totally unnoticed in the lower 
courts, for portions of it have been cited as support for pro-
jurisdiction propositions.151 Nonetheless, the language does not 
seem to have significantly changed the lower courts‘ under-
standing of the relevant ground rules. Perhaps the most serious 
post-Exxon Mobil engagement with the status of the narrow-
construction rule came in Palisades Collections L.L.C. v. 
Shorts,152 in which a panel of the Fourth Circuit divided in its 
interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions of the Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act (CAFA), with both the majority and dissent 
citing Exxon Mobil and discussing the canon. The majority cit-
ed language from Exxon Mobil to the effect that jurisdictional 
statutes should not be given an artificially narrow construc-
tion,153 but then—showing the canon‘s enduring grip on judicial 
 
Court decisions had expressed favor for interpreting jurisdictional statutes 
narrowly, Allapattah opined that jurisdictional statutes should presumptively 
be read neither broadly nor narrowly.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
 150. I have attempted a few search strategies, but I have found it difficult 
to find terms that are capacious enough to capture most invocations while at 
the same time not allowing in too many false positives. Therefore, the ap-
proach in this section is more impressionistic than quantitative. 
 151. E.g., Hood v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 681, 697 (S.D. 
Miss. 2013) (―The Court additionally finds that [a restriction on jurisdiction] 
cannot be read into the statute as urged by the State.‖ (citing Exxon Mobil, 
545 U.S. at 558)), rev’d, 737 F.3d 78 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Stein, 
No. 05-CRIM.-0888(LAK), 2007 WL 91350, at *15 n.111 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 
2007) (―The Supreme Court recently confirmed that Congress need not speak 
explicitly to authorize supplemental jurisdiction over additional parties.‖ (cit-
ing Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 557–59)). The Fifth Circuit decision reversing the 
district court in Hood did not cite Exxon Mobil; on the contrary, it cited nar-
row-construction language several times. 737 F.3d at 84, 89, 92. 
 152. 552 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 153. Id. at 330. 
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habits—the opinion nonetheless went on to quote and embrace 
statements of the traditional narrow-construction canon en 
route to denying federal jurisdiction.154 Judge Niemeyer‘s dis-
sent, in contrast, acknowledged the narrow-construction canon 
but then quoted Exxon Mobil to the effect that ―the canon can-
not defeat the plain meaning of the statutory language.‖155 The 
dissent added that the narrow-construction canon was prem-
ised on federalism, but that CAFA had already significantly 
expanded federal jurisdiction with the aim of altering the fed-
eral-state balance.156 All in all, my sense is that the dissent re-
garded Exxon Mobil as demoting the narrow-construction can-
on in importance, but not abolishing it, and that the majority 
did not regard Exxon Mobil as changing the canonical land-
scape in any meaningful way.  
Palisades is an example of a court seriously engaging with 
the canon‘s status, but that makes it unusual. Far more cases 
kept mentioning the narrow-construction canon without taking 
any notice of Exxon Mobil or other developments at all.157 In 
one telling (though admittedly atypical) example, a district 
court referred to the narrow-construction canon and cited as 
support, perhaps unwittingly, a dissent from the Eleventh Cir-
cuit‘s denial of rehearing in Exxon Mobil158—without mention-
ing the Supreme Court‘s subsequent decision, which, as we 
have been discussing, most certainly did not invoke the canon 
and, arguably, disapproved it. 
 
 154. Id. at 332–34, 336 & n.5. 
 155. Id. at 341 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 341–42. 
 157. See, e.g., Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., 733 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir. 
2013); Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat‘l Ass‘n, 479 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2007); 
In re Olympic Mills Corp., 477 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007); Arroyo v. FDIC, 961 F. 
Supp. 2d 386, 390 (D.P.R. 2013); Driskell v. Thompson, 971 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 
1059 (D. Colo. 2013); Brown v. Berhndt, 1:12-CV-00024-KGB, 2013 WL 
1704877, at *8 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 19, 2013); Osuch v. Optima Mach. Corp., No. 
CIV 10-6101, 2011 WL 2708464, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2011); Makro Capital 
of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d, 543 
F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2008). The canon remains particularly potent and oft-
cited when it comes to removal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Barbour v. Int‘l Union, 
640 F.3d 599, 605, 614 (4th Cir. 2011); Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 
577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 
1328 (11th Cir. 2006); Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1094–95 
(10th Cir. 2005).  
 158. RES–GA Four L.L.C. v. Avalon Builders of GA L.L.C., No. 5:10-CV-
463 (MTT), 2012 WL 13544, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2012). 
BRUHL_5fmt 1/3/2016 1:04 PM 
534 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:481 
 
Why didn‘t Exxon Mobil or other recent developments 
make a bigger splash? One important factor is that the narrow-
construction canon has a long history of frequent citation in the 
lower courts, so it would be surprising to see many lower courts 
change their priors based on language in a Supreme Court 
opinion that was only ambiguously repudiatory. An emphatic, 
self-conscious disavowal of the sort we saw in Mayo Founda-
tion159 would produce a quicker and more complete effect, or so 
one would suspect.  
We may now have the chance to find out. In December 
2014, in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company, L.L.C. v. 
Owens,160 the Supreme Court expressly repudiated the narrow-
construction canon insofar as it might apply in the context of 
cases involving CAFA. The case concerned the required con-
tents for a notice of removal to federal court, and it was abun-
dantly clear that the lower court had erred by imposing an ex-
cessive evidentiary burden on the party seeking to invoke 
federal jurisdiction.161 Given the obvious nature of the lower 
court‘s misunderstanding of removal requirements, it was per-
haps unnecessary for the Court to address the canon at all, but 
it did so anyway: 
[The lower court] relied, in part, on a purported ―presumption‖ 
against removal. We need not here decide whether such a presump-
tion is proper in mine-run diversity cases. It suffices to point out that 
no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which 
Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in 
federal court.162 
For good measure, the Court then cited a portion of CAFA‘s leg-
islative history stating that the statute‘s ―provisions should be 
read broadly,‖163 i.e., contrary to the traditional canon. Dart 
Cherokee must count as a clear repudiation of the canon in the 
CAFA context. Moreover, it is surprising, in light of long-
standing principles, that the Court would refer to the presump-
 
 159. See supra Part III (discussing the lower courts‘ reception of Mayo 
Foundation). 
 160. 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014). 
 161. The case was decided five to four, but the dissenters did not endorse 
the lower court‘s understanding of the removal statute on the merits but ra-
ther disputed whether the Supreme Court could reach the issue. 
 162. Id. at 554 (citation omitted). 
 163. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (2005), quoted in Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. 
at 554. 
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tion against removal in its more general form as merely a ―pur-
ported‖ rule. 
If one digs a little deeper, one finds that Dart Cherokee 
holds other surprises too. It turns out that the traditional nar-
row-construction canon had become the target of an interest-
group campaign. An amicus brief filed by the Washington Legal 
Foundation and other pro-business groups in Dart Cherokee 
took as its main purpose the aim of ―urg[ing] the Court to 
strongly disavow the existence of a presumption against re-
movability.‖164 An op-ed continued the campaign, stating that 
the case ―provides the Court an ideal opportunity to end the 
rule of construction whereby federal courts continue to narrow-
ly construe federal removal statutes against the party seeking 
removal.‖165 That the canon should come under attack becomes 
comprehensible when one considers that matters of jurisdiction 
and forum selection often have a political valence166—and that 
today civil defendants generally find the federal courts a friend-
lier forum than (some) state courts.167  
Another interesting feature of the attack on the narrow-
construction canon is the way it shows that the Supreme Court 
is not the only player in the interpretive game. Litigants and 
other interested parties, especially repeat players, will pursue 
rulings addressing broadly applicable interpretive rules, not 
just individual case outcomes. Attorneys (and courts too, for 
that matter) can be ―canon entrepreneurs‖ rather than just 
passive readers of the Supreme Court‘s sometimes-ambiguous 
instructions.  
What does the future hold for the traditional narrow-
construction canon?168 As the Supreme Court recognized in 
 
 164. Brief of Washington Legal Found., Int‘l Ass‘n of Def. Counsel, and 
Fed‘n of Def. & Corp. Counsel as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24, 
Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. 546 (No. 13-719), 2014 WL 2361914; see also id. at 2 
(―Amici are concerned that unless the Court uses this case not only to overturn 
the decision below but also to explain that the lower courts‘ recognition of a 
presumption against removal is unfounded, many federal courts will continue 
to adhere to such a presumption.‖). 
 165. Rich Samp, High Court Should Not “DIG” Dart Cherokee Basin Case, 
FORBES (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/10/21/high-court 
-should-not-dig-dart-cherokee-basin-case.  
 166. See Judith Resnik, Trial As Error, Jurisdiction As Injury: Transform-
ing the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 979 (2000). 
 167. See Patrick J. Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the 
Conflict of Laws, 70 LA. L. REV. 529, 532–33 (2010). 
 168. I explore this issue in greater depth in future work. Aaron-Andrew P. 
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Dart Cherokee, CAFA is a strong congressional statement in 
favor of expanding federal jurisdiction, a purpose at odds with 
the state-protective rationale that has traditionally supported 
the narrow-construction canon.169 Indeed, some CAFA cases 
are employing a canon according to which CAFA‘s general ju-
risdictional grant should be read broadly and the exceptions to 
that grant should be construed narrowly.170 CAFA is probably 
the most significant recent jurisdictional statute, and it will 
continue to generate interpretive questions into the foreseeable 
future, so its pro-federal thrust augurs poorly for the health of 
the traditional narrow-construction canon. 
Neither the Supreme Court‘s ambiguous rejection of the 
narrow-construction canon in Exxon Mobil nor the Court‘s gen-
eral neglect of the canon in the years before and after made 
much of an impact, but the early evidence shows that Dart 
Cherokee is having a greater effect on the lower courts, though 
perhaps not a revolutionary one.171 Some courts very quickly 
picked up on Dart Cherokee‘s abrogation of the canon in the 
CAFA context.172 Some other decisions, however, have contin-
ued to cite the strict-construction canon even in CAFA cases, 
without acknowledging Dart Cherokee.173 That some courts 
might not immediately assimilate a new decision is not surpris-
ing, though it does stand in contrast to the reception of Mayo 
Foundation‘s change in tax law, which was remarkably imme-
diate.174 Perhaps more surprising than the cases that overlook 
Dart Cherokee altogether are the CAFA decisions that show 
awareness of Dart Cherokee by citing it for some proposition 
 
Bruhl, Retiring the Jurisdictional Canon (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author).  
 169. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 170. E.g., N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. HarborView Mortg. Loan 
Trust 2006-4, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584–85, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 171. The Court‘s statement repudiating the canon was selected as a head-
note by West‘s attorneys, which should promote its transmission. The Court‘s 
statement about the canon in Exxon Mobil, by contrast, was not so selected. 
 172. E.g., Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 912 (11th Cir. 2014); 
Yocupicio v. PAE Group, L.L.C., No. CV 14-8958-GW, 2014 WL 7405445, at *2 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2014), rev’d, 795 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 173. E.g., Page v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., No. 2:13-CV-01333-MCE-
KJN, 2015 WL 966201, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015); Levanoff v. SoCal 
Wings L.L.C., No. SACV 14-01861-CJC, 2015 WL 248338, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 
16, 2015); Robinson v. Avanquest N. Am. Inc., No. 14 C 8015, 2015 WL 
196343, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2015). 
 174. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
BRUHL_5fmt 1/3/2016 1:04 PM 
2015] COMMUNICATING THE CANONS 537 
 
but that nonetheless still recite the traditional narrow-
construction canon.175 These courts apparently read Dart Cher-
okee for its main holding—that is, clarifying a rule about the 
necessary contents of a notice of removal—but fail to notice 
that it changes the interpretive regime. Inertia and habit are 
powerful, as we have now seen in several contexts. 
B. RUNAWAY CANONS 
We have just examined situations in which the lower 
courts were slow to react to changes in the Supreme Court‘s in-
terpretive regime. Yet the opposite scenario—overreaction in-
stead of underreaction—is possible too. With minimal prompt-
ing from the Supreme Court, a canon can take off in the lower 
courts. Once the Court puts a canon into the interpretive 
toolkit, even accidentally, it can take on a life of its own. In-
stead of zombies, some canons are, in this respect, like patho-
gens that escape from the lab. After entering the wild, their 
patterns of use need not be very closely linked to way the Su-
preme Court uses them. This Section discusses two examples, 
the first involving one of the most famous interpretive rules 
and the second involving a decidedly less prominent canon. 
The first example of canonical overreaction is the doctrine 
of Chevron deference, which famously requires that courts fol-
low reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, 
even where the court would have reached a different interpre-
tation on its own.176 The Supreme Court‘s 1984 decision in 
Chevron was not, at first, the historic emblem it has become. As 
Thomas Merrill‘s history of the Chevron decision explains, the 
opinion was not regarded as a landmark precedent by its au-
thor or by the other justices who joined it.177 Instead, Justice 
Stevens described his opinion merely as restating existing 
law.178 The Court did not treat Chevron as a major precedent in 
 
 175. E.g., Kidner v. P.F. Chang‘s China Bistro, Inc., No. CV 15-287 JGB 
KKx, 2015 WL 2453523, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2015); Leon v. Gordon Truck-
ing, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 1055, 1072 n.40 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Baker v. PDC Energy, 
Inc., No. 14-CV-02537-RM, 2014 WL 7445626, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2014). 
 176. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–44 (1984). 
 177. Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.: Sometimes Great Cases Are Made Not Born, in 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 164, 165, 183, 185–86 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 2011). 
 178. Id. at 186. 
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the following term‘s cases, and indeed the Court used Chevron 
only inconsistently for years.179 The earliest discussions in the 
lower courts did not regard the decision as revolutionary either. 
Notably, then-Judge Stephen Breyer of the First Circuit wrote 
two decisions citing Chevron in the early months, and both of 
them treated Chevron as no big deal.180 
How then did this little case become great? By ―accident,‖ 
according to Merrill.181 And, more interestingly, as a more re-
cent study by Gary Lawson and Stephen Kam further de-
tails,182 not through the Supreme Court‘s own doing. Rather, 
certain D.C. Circuit judges picked up on the framework and be-
gan giving it a broad reading as a generally applicable prece-
dent on the standard of review.183 The emerging Chevron doc-
trine, taking on a life beyond the humble Chevron case, then 
migrated back to the Supreme Court via former D.C. Circuit 
judges like Antonin Scalia and incoming Supreme Court clerks 
schooled in Chevron during previous clerkships on the D.C. 
Circuit.184 Only then did the decision catch on in the Supreme 
Court—and not without some resistance from its author185—
but by that time the contagion had already taken hold in the 
lower courts. Even today, Chevron probably plays a more sig-
nificant role in the lower courts than in the Supreme Court.186 
The story of Chevron presents an interesting dynamic in 
which a change was driven from below and later embraced (if 
 
 179. Id. at 186–87; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Exec-
utive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980–84 (1992) (measuring invocations of 
Chevron from its birth through the 1990 term). 
 180. Here I draw on Gary Lawson and Stephen Kam‘s recent article on 
Chevron‘s reception in the lower courts. See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, 
Making Law out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 33–38 (2013). 
 181. Merrill, supra note 177, at 193. 
 182. Lawson & Kam, supra note 180. 
 183. See id. at 39–59; Merrill, supra note 177, at 189–91. Judge Patricia 
Wald was perhaps the most crucial early adopter. See Merrill, supra note 177, 
at 190. A second factor that promoted Chevron‘s emergence, according to Mer-
rill, is that executive branch lawyers realized the decision‘s pro-government 
potential and pushed it on the courts in their briefing. See id. at 191–92. 
 184. Merrill, supra note 177, at 187–88. 
 185. Compare INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (Stevens, 
J.) (calling the question before the Court ―a pure question of statutory con-
struction for the courts to decide‖), with id. at 455 (Scalia, J., concurring) (―In 
my view, the Court badly misinterprets Chevron.‖). 
 186. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to 
Agency Interpretations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 758–60 (2013). 
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only incompletely) by the Supreme Court. A second example of 
an overshooting canon involves less back-and-forth interaction 
and lower theoretical stakes but similarly illustrates a situa-
tion in which a canon takes off in the lower courts with slight 
and unpremeditated encouragement from the Supreme Court. 
Recall, from Part II, that the prevalence of several established 
linguistic canons in the lower courts moved roughly in tandem 
with trends on the Supreme Court. But consider the behavior of 
the least cited of those canons: the rule of the last antecedent, 
which provides that a qualifying phrase modifies only the item 
immediately preceding it.187 The rule is old but not especially 
often invoked: during the twentieth century the Supreme Court 
could go decades at a time between mentions of it. Then, since 
about 2000, the Court has been mentioning it every few years, 
though never more than once per year. The last decade has also 
seen the canon practically explode in popularity in the lower 
courts, its prevalence increasing severalfold and outpacing the 
overall growth in use of linguistic canons. Now, to be sure, talk 
of an explosion should not be taken too far when the raw num-
bers are small. But still, it is a rather surprising development. 
The Supreme Court sneezed, and, as Figure 5 illustrates, the 
lower courts seem to be catching a cold. And the virus is, of all 
things, an obscure and weak grammatical canon.188 
 
 
 187. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (describing the rule of 
the last antecedent).  
 188. See Jeremy L. Ross, A Rule of Last Resort: A History of the Doctrine of 
the Last Antecedent in the United States Supreme Court, 39 SW. L. REV. 325, 
336 (2009) (―[A]pplication of the [rule of the last antecedent] is flexible, 
and . . . it is typically applied only where there is no contraindication from 
[other sources].‖). 
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Figure 5: Rule of the Last Antecedent, Annual Citations: 
1975–2014189 
 
As always, one needs to be cautious about making causal 
claims about the lower courts‘ citation patterns, but here there 
is at least some basis for thinking that the Supreme Court is 
responsible for the growth in citations and, moreover, that the 
influence can be traced to a particular decision. The Supreme 
Court‘s 2003 opinion in Barnhart v. Thomas, authored by Jus-
tice Scalia, engaged in an unusually extended discussion of the 
rule and included a memorable commonsensical illustration in-
volving a teenager‘s misbehavior.190 Of the fifty-two reported 
court of appeals cases invoking the rule of the last antecedent 
in the decade since Barnhart, a rather impressive thirty-six of 
them (sixty-nine percent) cited that case as support for the an-
cient canon.191 None of the Supreme Court‘s other recent uses 
 
 189. The search results shown here are a subset of the aggregate figures 
described above. See supra Part II. The WestlawNext search was: adv: 
OP(―last antecedent‖ /p (statut! or act or legislat! or congress! or ―U.S.C.‖)), 
with the results then disaggregated by year and limited to published opinions. 
 190. The Court gave the example of parents warning their teenage son that 
he should not ―throw a party or engage in any other activity that damages the 
house.‖ Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 27. Under the rule of the last antecedent, the 
qualifying phrase about damage to the house modifies only ―other activity,‖ 
such that parties are flatly banned regardless of damage. Id. at 27–28. 
 191. Barnhart was decided on November 12, 2003. The figures in the text 
were generated by (1) running a search in the court of appeals database for: 
adv: OP(―last antecedent‖ /p (statut! or act or legislat! or congress! or 
―U.S.C.‖)) & DA(aft 11-12-2003 and bef 2015); (2) limiting to published cases; 
(3) then using the ―search within results‖ feature to search for ―Barnhart /3 
Thomas.‖ As for what explains the canon‘s increased prominence in Supreme 
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of the canon has been cited as an authority on the canon nearly 
as much.192 In particular, although the Supreme Court cited 
the rule of the last antecedent (without following it) in its 1993 
decision in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank,193 that deci-
sion was cited in only four out of twenty-six (fifteen percent) of 
the uses of the last-antecedent canon in reported decisions of 
the courts of appeals in the decade between Nobelman and 
Barnhart.194  
It is understandable that canons might linger on in the 
lower courts without much recent support from the Supreme 
Court, a phenomenon we observed above in Part V.A. Prece-
dents that have not been overruled remain citable indefinitely, 
and one should expect that judges, like everyone else, are crea-
tures of habit. Established canons therefore have inertia. 
But why, then, do some canons take off with so little en-
couragement? It is hard to offer confident explanations given 
the few samples available and the many variables potentially 
at work. Nonetheless, there are some generalizable considera-
tions that probably play some role. I will return to this topic in 
Part VII.A.3 below, but one such factor that is worth mention-
ing here is whether a canon satisfies the human (and thus judi-
cial) desire to avoid effort—i.e., the desire for mechanisms and 
rules that reduce caseloads and ease the resolution of cases.195 
Effort aversion could explain some of Chevron‘s runaway suc-
cess in the lower courts, for it is generally easier to write an 
opinion affirming an agency view as reasonable than it is to re-
verse the agency.196 Deference is, accordingly, an appealing 
 
Court opinions, Caleb Nelson floats the intriguing possibility that the canon‘s 
relatively prominent treatment in the leading Legislation casebook influenced 
the Court‘s future clerks. CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 225–
26 (2011). 
 192. The author of a recent study of the rule of the last antecedent has 
likewise noted an increase in the canon‘s prevalence in the lower courts and 
hypothesized that Barnhart is responsible. See Ross, supra note 188, at 332–
34, 336–37. 
 193. 508 U.S. 324, 330–31 (1993). 
 194. To obtain these results, I ran the following search in the court of ap-
peals database: adv: OP(―last antecedent‖ /p (statut! or act or legislat! or con-
gress! or ―U.S.C.‖)) & DA(aft 05-31-1993 & bef 11-13-2003). Then I limited re-
sults to published cases and searched within results for Nobelman. 
 195. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 36–40 (2013) (discussing doctrines and prac-
tices that might serve judicial preferences for leisure). 
 196. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of 
Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 90–93 (2011) (suggesting that 
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path of least resistance for busy judges who lack the luxury of 
the Supreme Court‘s discretionary docket. Another potentially 
generalizable consideration is that shifts in docket composition 
(such as would accompany the enactment of important new leg-
islation) can increase the need for the substantive canons gov-
erning the growth area. But as for the recent popularity of the 
rule of the last antecedent, I cannot provide a very satisfying 
explanation apart from the above-described possibility that one 
particular Supreme Court decision increased the old canon‘s sa-
lience. If that is indeed what has happened, few observers 
would have seen it coming.  
The following Part continues the discussion of factors that 
bear on a canon‘s rise, as we examine the birth and first steps 
of a new canon. 
VI.  CANON CRYSTALLIZATION   
In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, which 
concerned the scope of the EPA‘s authority under the Clean Air 
Act, Justice Scalia joined a sensible principle of interpretation 
to an evocative metaphor and in so doing christened a new can-
on of interpretation. Congress, he wrote, ―does not alter the 
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or 
ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants 
in mouseholes.‖197 The ―no elephants in mouseholes‖ canon now 
occupies a secure, if limited, place in the interpretive land-
scape.198  
To call the canon new is not to deny it had forerunners. 
Although Justice Scalia introduced the ―no elephants in 
mouseholes‖ phrasing into the interpretive lexicon, he did not 
invent the sensible idea that one should hesitate before finding 
a serious change in the law or a major delegation of authority 
hiding in an unassuming, easy-to-miss provision. The relevant 
passage in his opinion cited two previous cases. One of those, 
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, concerned whether 
the FCC‘s authority to ―modify‖ regulatory requirements per-
mitted it to abolish the requirement that nondominant long-
 
other circuits are more deferential than the D.C. Circuit partially because of a 
higher docket load).  
 197. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 198. See generally Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in 
Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19 (2010) (discussing and evaluating the can-
on). 
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distance carriers file their rates.199 There the Court had ruled, 
again through Justice Scalia, that the agency had no such au-
thority to waive the requirement, reasoning that rate-filing was 
a crucial part of the regulatory scheme.200 ―It is highly unlike-
ly,‖ the Court stated, ―that Congress would leave the determi-
nation of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substan-
tially, rate-regulated to agency discretion—and even more 
unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle de-
vice as permission to ‗modify‘ rate-filing requirements.‖201 The 
other prior case cited in Whitman v. ATA as the inspiration for 
the ―no elephants in mouseholes‖ canon was FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., in which the Court rejected the 
FDA‘s attempt to regulate tobacco as a drug.202 Justice 
O‘Connor‘s opinion in that case ended by citing MCI v. AT&T 
and stating that the Court should hesitate before finding that 
Congress had delegated authority to an agency to regulate a 
matter of great ―economic and political significance‖ through 
―cryptic‖ language.203  
The advent and early history of the ―no elephants in 
mouseholes‖ rule is instructive in a few ways.  
To begin with, it illustrates the phenomenon of what we 
could call ―canon crystallization,‖ the mechanism by which an 
interpretive notion or practice with many possible names comes 
to be called one particular thing. In this case in particular, the 
name is a memorable metaphor about elephants in mouseholes, 
which one would expect to aid the canon‘s propagation. That 
capacity to communicate, to stick in the mind and rise quickly 
to the lips in the future, is, after all, an aspect of metaphor‘s 
genius.204  
 
 199. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 220, 224–25 (1994).  
 200. Id. at 229–31. 
 201. Id. at 231. 
 202. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000).  
 203. Id. at 160. 
 204. Cf. JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE DEHUMANIZATION OF ART AND OTH-
ER ESSAYS ON ART, CULTURE, AND LITERATURE 33 (1968) (―The metaphor is 
perhaps one of man‘s most fruitful potentialities. Its efficacy verges on magic, 
and it seems a tool for creation which God forgot inside one of His creatures 
when He made him.‖). The Scalia and Garner treatise gives names to some 
interpretive moves that heretofore have not had a commonly used label, but 
most of these attempts at crystallization are far less memorable than ―no ele-
phants in mouseholes.‖ See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 54, at xiii (re-
ferring to the ―series-qualifier canon‖ and the ―scope-of-subparts canon‖). 
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To measure the effect of crystallization, and of the ele-
phant metaphor in particular, one can compare citations of the 
―no elephants in mouseholes‖ canon to other ways of expressing 
the same basic idea through other language. This can be done 
in a few ways. As one approach, one can measure how often 
lower courts have cited Whitman v. ATA for the elephant canon 
as compared to the same opinion‘s nearby non-metaphorical 
language about ―vague terms or ancillary provisions.‖205 The 
following table provides data on lower-court citations of the el-
ephant language and the non-metaphorical language; because a 
subsequent case can cite both phrasings, the table also shows 
how many cases cite only one phrasing without the other. 
 
Table 2: Lower-Court Citations to Whitman v. ATA’s Ele-
phant Canon Versus Non-Metaphorical Language206 
 
Elephant  
language: 
66 citations Non-metaphorical 
language: 
29 citations 
Elephant  
language without 
non-metaphorical  
language: 
36 citations Non-metaphorical 
language without  
elephant  
language: 
0 citations 
 
The ―no elephants in mouseholes‖ canon has been cited 
more than twice as often as the non-metaphorical language, 
but the stunning fact is that the non-metaphorical language 
from Whitman v. ATA has not been cited by itself in any case in 
the lower federal courts.207  
Another approach is to compare citations of the elephant 
language to citations of alternative formulations of the idea 
 
 205. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 206. The following searches were run in the WestlawNext ALLFEDS data-
base, with Supreme Court results then excluded:  
adv: whitman /p (elephant /s mousehole);  
adv: whitman /p (―vague terms‖ or ―ancillary provisions‖);  
adv: whitman /p (elephant /s mousehole) BUT NOT (―vague terms‖ or ―an-
cillary provisions‖);  
adv:(―vague terms‖ or ―ancillary provisions‖) /p whitman BUT NOT ele-
phant. 
The searches were run on January 2, 2015. I searched the term ―Whitman‖ 
rather than using KeyCite because the latter strategy returned false positives 
due to a headnote that refers to ―ancillary provisions‖ in a different context. 
 207. The non-metaphorical language from Whitman v. ATA has been cited 
twice without the elephant language by the Supreme Court itself. King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015); Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jun-
ior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2199 (2011).  
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that appear in other sources. The alternative sources obviously 
include the passages in MCI v. AT&T and FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson that Whitman v. ATA cited as the inspiration for 
the elephant canon. Another alternative formulation is the 
―major questions doctrine,‖ a phrasing that some academic 
commentators have used to express the idea present in these 
cases.208 Here again, the elephant language has proven much 
more popular than these competitors, at least as judged by cita-
tions in lower courts.209 
In addition, the early history of the ―no elephants in 
mouseholes‖ rule is instructive because it points to another fac-
tor, besides verbal crystallization, that plays a role in a canon‘s 
propagation: the rhetorical choices of attorneys. The elephant 
canon took a while to catch on in the lower courts, but its use 
has grown notably over time. The canon‘s ascent has arguably 
been fueled more by attorneys than by the Supreme Court. The 
first citation of the canon in the federal courts of appeals and 
the first citation in the federal district courts, both of which oc-
curred about two-and-a-half years after Whitman v. ATA, came 
in cases in which the attorneys heavily relied on the canon, go-
ing so far as to mention it by name in headings in the briefs.210 
In the first five years of the canon‘s life, it was cited in six cases 
in the federal courts of appeals, and at least five of them had 
briefs that cited the canon. That is a higher rate of correspond-
 
 208. E.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Excep-
tion to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why Massachu-
setts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 231–47 (2006). The ―major questions‖ 
phrasing may have originated with then-Judge Breyer. See Stephen G. Breyer, 
Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 
(1986) (―Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major 
questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the 
course of the statute‘s daily administration.‖), quoted in FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson, 529 U.S. at 159. 
 209. A list of the results of searches for various formulations is on file with 
the author. Note that the various phrasings of the idea are not precisely paral-
lel in their potential application. The elephant canon got its start in adminis-
trative law, and that remains the central application, but it can apply to any 
situation in which a major decision is said to be lurking in a minor provision, 
thus generating more opportunities for use than, for example, the ―major 
questions‖ doctrine. 
 210. Appellants‘ Opening Brief at 33, NISH v. Rumsfeld, 348 F.3d 1263 
(10th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-2089), 2002 WL 32507885; Memorandum of the Am. 
Bar Ass‘n in Opposition to the FTC‘s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 10, 
Am. Bar Ass‘n v. FTC, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. 1:02-cv-01883-
RB), 2003 WL 24207845. 
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ence between briefs and cases than one finds in most later 
years,211 perhaps because courts no longer need as much 
prompting once a canon becomes more popular. The canon‘s 
rise, such as it is, has not been encouraged much by the Su-
preme Court, for the Court has employed the canon only spo-
radically. After the canon‘s first appearance in Whitman v. 
ATA, it did not appear again in the U.S. Reports at all until five 
years later, in 2006.212 Since then it has appeared in the Su-
preme Court several times but only once more in a majority 
opinion,213 for a grand total of three appearances in majority 
opinions so far (versus seven appearances in dissents).  
These findings are no more than suggestive, but, together 
with other findings reported earlier,214 they illustrate the point 
that attorneys and other intermediaries play a role in canon 
development just as they play a role in the development of the 
law more broadly.  
VII.  SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS   
The survey above obviously does not include every argua-
ble instance of the phenomenon of canonical change, nor does it 
seem possible that one could deem any sample ―representative‖ 
of the universe of arguable interpretive shifts. There are many 
variables that can plausibly affect the speed and accuracy of 
communications through the judicial system, and it is difficult 
to isolate them for analysis. Nonetheless, having now reviewed 
some of the dynamics and possibilities revealed by our exam-
ples, we are in a position to provide some structure to the ob-
servations and offer some tentative generalizations. In particu-
lar, we can now offer a preliminary answer to the question of 
what factors affect how the lower courts react to arguable 
changes in the interpretive regime. We also have some new in-
formation with which to assess the value of implementing (as 
 
 211. Results list on file with author. In trying to find correspondences be-
tween canon citations in opinions and in briefs, one should keep in mind that 
Westlaw‘s databases have incomplete coverage of briefs, especially in trial 
courts; not finding a brief that corresponds to a case citation does not neces-
sarily mean that no such brief existed. 
 212. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006). 
 213. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 116 (2008). 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88 (discussing the role of gov-
ernment attorneys in bringing Mayo Foundation to the attention of lower 
courts) and 164–166 (discussing the campaign against the subject-matter ju-
risdiction canon). 
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some theorists would have us do) a more rigorous system of 
methodological precedent. 
A. FACTORS BEARING ON LOWER-COURT RESPONSIVENESS 
The factors that may influence the speed and accuracy 
with which changes in the interpretive regime spread through 
the judicial system can be divided into several groups: factors 
stemming from the nature of particular canons, factors related 
to the type of change at issue, factors deriving from the charac-
teristics of the lower courts, and factors involving the broader 
institutional context.  
1. Different Kinds of Canons 
The canons are typically divided into several broad catego-
ries, such as textual canons, substantive policy canons, and 
canons about the use of extrinsic sources (notably legislative 
history and agency interpretations), with each category then 
being further divided into subcategories.215 Some of the discus-
sion above supports certain category-based generalizations. We 
saw, for example, that many textual canons possess features 
(such as long pedigrees and intuitive rooting) that make their 
meanings resistant to fine-tuning.216 Other categories of canons 
tend to differ in those respects, with the clearest examples be-
ing canons related to Chevron.217  
Nonetheless, making generalizations based on which of the 
taxonomical categories a canon falls into is not the only way to 
proceed—and it probably is not the most illuminating way to 
proceed. Any given canon can change in many different re-
spects: for example, it can gain or lose weight in the interpre-
tive scales, it can become more or less frequently cited, and it 
can expand or contract in terms of the range of situations to 
which it applies. The factors that bear on the success of those 
different kinds of changes can cut across traditional categoriza-
tions. Therefore, it makes sense to turn our attention to other 
kinds of factors that affect the propagation of canonical change. 
 
 215. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 6 (categorizing canons in this 
way). 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 96 and 106. 
 217. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
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2. Different Kinds of Changes 
Other things being equal, one would expect that clear and 
consistent instructions are more likely to be understood and fol-
lowed than unclear and inconsistent instructions. Much of the 
complaint about the Supreme Court‘s interpretive methodolo-
gy, of course, is that it is complex and conflicting. But even 
when the Court does make up its own mind about some matter, 
certain types of instructions about canons are just harder to 
convey than others. To aid in generalizing about patterns, and 
in making predictions, let us separate out several different as-
pects of canons that might change. Although these distinctions 
admittedly blur at the boundaries, we can distinguish among a 
canon‘s existence, its scope, and its power, all of which can at 
least in principle be changed. 
Existence refers to whether a purported canon is a legiti-
mate interpretive rule. Examples of existential changes in the 
interpretive toolkit would include a decision abrogating a par-
ticular substantive canon218 and the British judiciary‘s now-
rescinded ban on using legislative history.219 
Scope refers to the range of circumstances in which the 
canon applies. Examples are whether Chevron deference ap-
plies to Treasury regulations, whether the presumption against 
preemption applies to express-preemption clauses as well as 
implied-preemption disputes, and how serious a constitutional 
concern about an interpretation needs to be in order to trigger 
the canon requiring avoidance of interpretations that raise con-
stitutional doubts.220 The first two examples just given are di-
chotomous—the canon either applies or not to the specified cir-
cumstances—but the third example is more a matter of degree 
in that it concerns the precise point along the continuum of 
constitutional worries (ranging from fairly insubstantial con-
cerns to grave doubt) at which the avoidance canon kicks in. 
 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 160–63 (discussing the Supreme 
Court‘s repudiation of the presumption against jurisdiction in cases under 
CAFA). 
 219. See James J. Brudney, The Story of Pepper v. Hart: Examining Legis-
lative History Across the Pond, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES, supra 
note 177, at 259. 
 220. As these examples may reveal, one can often recharacterize questions 
of scope as questions of existence (and vice versa). Mayo Foundation, for in-
stance, could be treated as a ruling about the scope of Chevron deference or 
about the existence of a distinct National Muffler regime. See supra Part III. 
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Power is a more complicated concept that itself divides into 
several sub-characteristics: priority, weight, and frequency. 
Priority concerns a canon‘s place in the hierarchy of inter-
pretive sources. Depending on what a high-priority source 
shows, the court might not consider any lower-priority sources. 
The enacted text holds a high-priority status for many judges 
in that facially clear text can preclude any recourse to other 
considerations such as legislative history or substantive can-
ons. Another example would be a rule that prioritizes the rule 
of lenity ahead of legislative history, such that legislative histo-
ry cannot resolve textual ambiguity against the defendant.  
Weight refers to the strength of a canon in determining 
outcomes. It could be that several potentially conflicting canons 
all apply in a given case. Some of them, other things equal, 
may simply be more powerful than others. Punctuation, for ex-
ample, is said to be a particularly weak contributor, easily 
overcome by other considerations.221 So too with the grammati-
cal rule of the last antecedent, which carries some weight but 
frequently yields to other indications of meaning.222 
Frequency refers to how often—usually, rarely, never?—a 
canon appears in judicial analysis when the canon is arguably 
applicable. An example is how often the courts consider practi-
cal consequences or legislative history.223 Frequency differs in 
kind from other characteristics of canons; it cannot be dis-
cerned from what any particular opinion says about a canon, 
but rather one can only estimate it from how a court behaves 
over many cases.  
As already acknowledged, the categories set forth above 
are not airtight, but one can nonetheless use them to offer some 
generalizations. In particular, we can say that certain canon 
characteristics are easier for the Supreme Court to modify, and 
for lower courts to perceive modifications in, than others. This 
is true whether or not formal rules of stare decisis apply. 
 
 221. See, e.g., Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U.S. 85, 91 (1925) (holding that a 
comma was not persuasive evidence of legislative intent). 
 222. See Ross, supra note 188. 
 223. Obviously, other types of rules, such as rules of priority or existence, 
will affect how frequently a given source will appear. For example, if the gov-
erning methodology put legislative history off-limits except in narrow circum-
stances (e.g., in order to confirm that Congress did not intend a facially absurd 
meaning), then it would appear very infrequently.  
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To begin with matters that are relatively easy to communi-
cate through the system, it seems that rules of existence—e.g., 
a hypothetical rule that legislative history is off limits as an in-
terpretive resource—should be easy to convey, at least in theo-
ry. (In practice, the intuitions behind some canons would not be 
so easy to eradicate.224) Also on the easy side, other things be-
ing equal, are matters of scope that have a dichotomous nature 
(that is, the canon either applies or not to specified circum-
stances). Mayo Foundation involved this sort of change in the 
scope of the Chevron doctrine, and it was very successful 
(though it benefitted from other favorable circumstances 
too225). Likewise, one could predict that the lower courts would 
easily pick up on a decision clearly providing that express 
preemption clauses are not within the scope of the presumption 
against preemption.226 But questions of scope that are non-
dichotomous, like the matter of what (if anything) Ali v. Feder-
al Bureau of Prisons said about the proper uses of ejusdem gen-
eris,227 are harder to express and understand. 
A canon‘s power is generally hard to control and communi-
cate. This is especially true of the frequency dimension of pow-
er, because accurately measuring frequency requires looking at 
patterns of use over many cases rather than just finding some 
language in an opinion. Given the Supreme Court‘s rather 
small docket (around seventy-five cases per term, recently), 
most canons will appear quite rarely. A big year for a particu-
lar canon might amount to several cases employing it, and the 
next year the canon might disappear due to random fluctua-
tions. Consider, for example, the familiar linguistic canon 
noscitur a sociis, which instructs that a word draws meaning 
from the words surrounding it.228 It appeared in zero cases in 
the Supreme Court‘s 2008 Term, skyrocketed to three cases in 
the 2009 Term, and dropped back to one case in the 2010 
Term,229 but surely this evidence does not demonstrate a true 
 
 224. See supra Part IV. 
 225. See supra Part III. 
 226. Cf. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2189 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing with a por-
tion of the plurality opinion applying a presumption against preemption to an 
express preemption clause and noting the Court‘s ―sporadic‖ use of the canon). 
 227. See supra Part IV. 
 228. POPKIN, supra note 36, at 201. 
 229. I described my protocol for searching for linguistic canons above. See 
supra notes 37–38. 
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change in the relative importance of the canon from one year to 
the next (though broad-based, sustained patterns over a longer 
period could be meaningful).  
Adding to the difficulty of accurately perceiving signals 
about frequency, what the Supreme Court says about method-
ology might actually misrepresent the relative importance of 
various sources. Based on the official doctrines, one might sup-
pose that the Supreme Court would use Chevron or some other 
deference regime in almost every case in which an agency in-
terpretation is at issue—and yet the Supreme Court often does 
not even cite any deference regime in many cases in which it 
seemingly should, let alone follow the doctrines faithfully.230 In 
this way Chevron is not as important on the Supreme Court as 
one might gather from the Court‘s official pronouncements. For 
an example representing the reverse—that is, a canon that is 
more important than the Court lets on—it may be that the 
Court considers policy consequences much more often than one 
might glean from listening to some of its more formalist and 
textualist members.231 To the extent that the Court‘s pro-
nouncements about the relative importance of a canon differ 
from its actual rate of use, the lower courts will probably at-
tend more to the pronouncements. Most lower-court judges are 
too busy to read all of the Supreme Court‘s cases and recognize 
when words and deeds diverge (though perhaps academic stud-
ies can help enlighten them). Maybe the Court likes it that 
way: it can use its language to tell lower courts what to do, 
even if it doesn‘t do as it says in its own cases.  
One particular frequency-related problem we have encoun-
tered concerns how to silence a canon. If the Supreme Court 
expressly abrogates or redefines a canon—as the Court recently 
did when it repudiated the narrow-construction-of-jurisdiction 
canon for cases arising under CAFA232—one expects that mes-
 
 230. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 67, at 1090, 1117, 1120–21, 1124–25 
(reporting that in a majority of cases involving an agency interpretation, the 
Court invoked no deference regime); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Chevron As a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Moti-
vates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1764–66 
(2010) (arguing that the Justices treat deference regimes as flexible presump-
tions rather than as rigidly binding precedents). 
 231. See Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 
1009, 1012–15 (2011) (explaining that consequentialist arguments are com-
mon even among textualists). 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 160–63. 
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sage would be heard relatively clearly. But, as we saw with the 
examples of civil rights and earlier decisions on subject-matter 
jurisdiction, mere neglect is more difficult for lower courts to 
pick up on. Precedents in our system remain valid indefinitely 
unless and until overruled. And given the non-mandatory na-
ture of the canons, failure to cite does not equal implicit over-
ruling. At least from the perspective of lower courts, a canon 
remains in the toolkit even if the Supreme Court has not pulled 
it out for quite some time. 
A canon‘s weight, too, is probably hard to adjust in any 
very precise way. Pronouncements about a canon‘s weight are 
in theory easy to state, but it is unclear what exactly they mean 
in practical terms. It is hard to imagine that a directive to give 
a certain source or presumption ―great weight‖ versus ―signifi-
cant weight‖ could have a very precise real-world impact. 
(Likewise, it is hard for the researcher to study canon weight, 
as distinguished from either citation rates or verbal formula-
tions of canon meaning.) Further, although dissenting opinions 
and academic commentators have criticized the Court for its 
occasional practice of elevating presumptions into clear-
statement rules or even into ―super-strong‖ clear-statement 
rules,233 I suspect that such distinctions, though not totally lost 
on the lower courts, would matter less in practice than they do 
in theory. 
The aspect of power that is probably easiest to communi-
cate (again, other things being equal) is priority. An order of 
operations is achievable, even if the precise force of each opera-
tor is hard to gauge or control. This may well explain the ap-
peal of tiered interpretive frameworks such as the ―modified 
textualism‖ described in Gluck‘s study of several state 
courts.234 In this three-level interpretive approach, the first 
step is limited to textual analysis, including textual structure 
and textual canons.235 If the statute is deemed ambiguous, the 
court then moves on to the second step, at which legislative his-
tory is admissible.236 If that still does not resolve the interpre-
tive question, the court then turns to substantive canons and 
 
 233. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 31, at 615–17 (discussing the 
evolution of the rule against extraterritorial application of statutes). 
 234. See Gluck, supra note 4. 
 235. See id. at 1758, 1829–32. 
 236. See id. at 1835–36, 1839. 
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default rules.237 According to Gluck‘s research, states that have 
found the most success in establishing binding frameworks 
have often done so by using such tiered approaches, with the 
most notable example being the framework employed for more 
than a decade in Oregon.238 To be clear, one should not over-
state the success of Oregon‘s tiered model. The first step‘s pur-
ported ban on considering legislative history in the absence of 
ambiguity was abandoned several years ago, ostensibly in re-
sponse to the legislature‘s disagreement with it.239 And even 
while the regime was in effect, some observers of the Oregon 
experiment doubted that the facial rigidity of the framework 
contributed to actual consistency or simplicity in decision mak-
ing, in part because the analysis at the first step often involved 
a mélange of un-ordered and potentially conflicting presump-
tions and inferences about likely meaning.240 Still, even a lim-
ited and temporary success shows that binding frameworks of 
the order-of-operations sort are at least relatively feasible. 
3. Features of the Lower Courts 
The lower courts‘ receptivity to changes in the interpretive 
landscape is another factor bearing on the propagation of can-
ons through the system. Their receptivity to changes likely de-
pends, in turn, on several features, including their own inter-
pretive preferences and needs.  
As for preferences, lower-court judges have motivations 
beyond just being faithful agents of the Supreme Court.241 Ob-
vious sources of potentially contrary motivations are a judge‘s 
own jurisprudential approach and political ideology. Such 
commitments can affect a judge‘s views on a wide range of in-
terpretive issues, including the role of legislative intent, the 
 
 237. See id. at 1830–31, 1839–40.  
 238. Id. at 1775–85, 1855–58; cf. Jack L. Landau, Oregon As a Laboratory 
of Statutory Interpretation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 563, 566–73 (2011) 
(concluding that the Oregon framework brought more order to statutory inter-
pretation, though it also suffered from several deficiencies). 
 239. See State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042, 1046–51 (Or. 2009). 
 240. See Steven J. Johansen, What Does Ambiguous Mean? Making Sense 
of Statutory Analysis in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 219, 220, 251 (1998); 
Robert M. Wilsey, Comment, Paltry, General & Eclectic: Why the Oregon Su-
preme Court Should Scrap PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, 44 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 615, 618–19, 625–28, 664–65 (2008). 
 241. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 195, at 25–50 (setting 
forth an approach to judicial behavior according to which judges are self-
interested employees with multiple goals). 
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degree of deference agencies should enjoy, and the value of sub-
stantive canons that favor particular groups or interests (civil-
rights plaintiffs, those seeking exemptions from tax laws, etc.).  
Another important type of judicial self-interest, probably 
less obvious but potentially very important in the lower courts, 
is the desire for mechanisms and rules that reduce caseloads 
and ease the resolution of cases.242 As a general matter, we can 
expect that lower courts will be especially reluctant to embrace 
new doctrines that increase their workload, such as new tests 
that involve complex, multi-factored analyses, and that they 
will be especially likely to welcome new doctrines that provide 
for quick and simple decision making.243 The judicial preference 
for leisure might have some important effects when it comes to 
statutory interpretation. It could explain some of Chevron‘s 
success in the lower courts, for it is generally easier to write an 
opinion affirming an agency view as reasonable than it is to re-
verse the agency, and so deference is an appealing option for 
busy judges.244 Moreover, quite apart from the decisional 
shortcuts any particular rule might afford, simply having a 
regular, established structure for analysis is a benefit all by it-
self for lower-court judges who deal, as compared to the Su-
preme Court Justices, with many interpretive problems that 
are complicated but lack serious attitudinal stakes. For similar 
reasons, the lower courts could be expected, other things being 
equal, to be amenable to rules restricting the consultation of 
legislative history. A preference for docket reduction might also 
explain why the lower courts responded only slowly to the Su-
preme Court‘s neglect and disparagement of the presumption 
against federal jurisdiction.245 
As for the lower courts‘ need for various canons, a court‘s 
demand for a particular canon depends on the court‘s docket 
composition and role in the judicial system. For example, alt-
hough the ―no elephants in mouseholes‖ canon is catching on in 
the courts of appeals,246 it will never be a high-frequency canon, 
especially in the district courts. Many suits challenging agency 
action skip the district courts and begin directly in the courts of 
 
 242. See id. at 36–40 (discussing doctrines and practices that might serve 
judicial preferences for leisure). 
 243. See Tokson, supra note 27, at 912–16, 928–29.  
 244. See supra text accompanying note 196. 
 245. I consider this possibility in greater detail in Bruhl, supra note 168. 
 246. See supra Part VI. 
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appeals,247 thus precluding many potential uses at the bottom 
of the hierarchy. (Jurisdictional considerations, aided by some 
path-dependence and silo effects, likely also explain why the 
D.C. Circuit accounts for a disproportionate share of the refer-
ences to the elephant canon among the courts of appeals.248) 
Moreover, the elephant rule is a particularly complicated and 
specialized canon (versus, say, most linguistic canons, or even 
citations to legislative history). Applying it requires the court to 
measure the policy significance of a proposed interpretation 
(the potential elephant) and assess the role of a particular 
statutory provision (the mousehole) within a larger regulatory 
scheme. Such interpretive moves are more likely to be neces-
sary as cases become more complex, and they are more likely to 
be feasible as resources become more abundant. Both of those 
things happen as one moves up the judicial hierarchy.249 In 
sum, the propagation of a canon depends on the environmental 
conditions, and different courts provide more hospitable niches 
for different canons. 
4. Features of the Broader Institutional Context 
The propagation of canons through the system also de-
pends on features of the broader institutional context. This con-
text notably includes attorneys and litigants. Courts do their 
own research, but attorneys‘ choices about which points to ar-
gue and emphasize, and litigants‘ choices about which cases to 
bring, play a role in driving legal developments in interpretive 
methodology just as they do elsewhere.250 Although this Article 
presents only a few suggestive episodes, there is good reason to 
 
 247. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2012) (certain orders of the FCC and several 
other agencies); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012) (various EPA actions under the 
Clean Air Act). 
 248. Through the end of 2014, the D.C. Circuit has accounted for eighteen 
of forty-nine citations in published decisions of the federal courts of appeals.  
 249. See Bruhl, supra note 22, at 470–79 (contrasting decision making in 
the Supreme Court and lower courts in these respects). 
 250. Valuable recent contributions in this vein include Parrillo‘s work on 
the role of New Deal agency lawyers and Washington law firms in pushing 
legislative history on the Supreme Court. Parrillo, supra note 30. Plagiarism 
detection software has recently been employed to examine the influence of le-
gal briefs on the content of judicial opinions. See Pamela C. Corley, The Su-
preme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 61 POL. 
RES. Q. 468 (2008); Adam Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court 
Opinion Language (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2574451. 
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believe that attorneys can play the role of canon entrepreneurs, 
helping lower courts catch on to new canons (as with Mayo 
Foundation and ―no elephants in mouseholes‖) or even waging 
a campaign against a venerable old canon (as with the canon of 
narrow construction of subject-matter jurisdiction). The struc-
ture of the bar could matter as well, as the existence of a highly 
specialized bar may have accelerated the system‘s reception of 
Mayo Foundation‘s change in the deference regime governing 
tax regulations. Additional research into the role of attorneys 
and other canon entrepreneurs would be fruitful. 
The broader context includes other actors beyond attorneys 
and litigants. Congress can play a role in shaping the develop-
ment of the interpretive regime by enacting new legislation 
that then creates a drag on certain canons (as with CAFA‘s 
pressure on the traditional subject-matter jurisdiction canon251) 
or encourages the growth of others (as with the migration of 
the traditional civil-rights canon to the disability context in the 
wake of the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
and amendments thereto252). Congress can also promulgate its 
own interpretive canons and act as a competing source of ca-
nonical leadership in the lower courts, with the disability con-
text again providing an example.253  
Many other factors could potentially play a role in canon 
communication and would benefit from further investigation. 
The rise of legal blogs and instant electronic communication 
does not guarantee that developments will be transmitted to 
the lower courts more quickly today than they were in the past, 
but such new technologies and media must help. The prolifera-
tion of required Legislation and Regulation courses254 could 
play a role in communicating the canons to the lower courts by 
educating their future law clerks in recent developments. 
Books about statutory interpretation such as the one recently 
authored by Scalia and Garner,255 the decisions of Lexis and 
 
 251. See supra text accompanying notes 160–70. 
 252. See supra text accompanying notes 131–36. 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 133–36. 
 254. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Ripple Effect of “Leg-Reg” on the Study of Leg-
islation and Administrative Law in the Law School Curriculum, 65 J. LEGAL 
ED. 121, 123, 126 (2015) (reporting survey results on recent growth of required 
courses in Legislation and Regulation). 
 255. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 54. The book has already been cited 
many times by courts, as a quick search of electronic databases will reveal. 
The book‘s popularity with courts is quite striking given that the book is 
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Westlaw attorneys about whether to turn opinion language into 
a headnote256—the universe of potential influences is vast and 
mostly uncharted. The broader point here is that information 
does not only flow directly from the Supreme Court down; the 
pathways are multiple and are mediated by other actors. 
B. THE LIMITS OF METHODOLOGICAL STARE DECISIS 
Finally, to return to one of the topics broached at the out-
set of this Article and touched upon at several points along the 
way, the findings here provide some valuable perspective on 
the push for greater methodological stare decisis, particularly 
in its vertical aspect (that is, the requirement that lower courts 
follow the rulings of higher courts). More specifically, the find-
ings show some limits to the utility of the stare decisis project.  
First, even in the absence of the ordinary doctrines of prec-
edent, we have seen that the lower courts often at least roughly 
follow the Supreme Court‘s lead, both as regards broad trends 
(e.g., the textualist shift described in Part II) and more discrete 
shifts in interpretive rules (e.g., the Mayo Foundation case dis-
cussed in Part III and the recently announced partial abroga-
tion of the subject-matter jurisdiction canon noted in Part 
V.A.2). The current system is already semi-precedential, at 
least as a matter of the facts on the ground.  
Second, and probably more importantly, in those instances 
in which the lower courts are not tightly yoked to the Supreme 
Court, the culprit does not seem to be the lack of formal doc-
trines of vertical precedent. Here I do not simply repeat the ob-
servation that the Court itself is inconsistent in its approaches, 
such that even the most faithful and attentive agent would not 
know what to do (though often that is true). Even if the Court 
became more consistent, there are deeper problems at work 
here. Some canons just do not lend themselves to fine-tuning. 
And some changes in the interpretive regime are hard to com-
municate and perceive, with frequency of canon usage being a 
prime example. Making methodology more ―binding‖ would not 
solve these problems. If anything, a regime of formally binding 
precedent would further encourage lower courts to rely on the 
Court‘s potentially misleading pronouncements about the can-
ons rather than following the Court‘s actual behavior. That 
 
avowedly normative rather than descriptive of current practice. Id. at 9. 
 256. See supra note 171. 
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may be a result that the Justices would like just fine, but it 
probably is not what the proponents of methodological prece-
dent—who tend to extol rule-of-law virtues like uniformity and 
transparency—have in mind. 
The foregoing observations do not establish that the meth-
odological stare decisis program is without worth. However, 
they do suggest, at a minimum, that the additional headway it 
can make is fundamentally limited.  
  CONCLUSION   
This Article has explored what happens in the lower courts 
when the Supreme Court changes the interpretive regime. 
There is no universal answer, but a review of a number of epi-
sodes of canonical evolution is illuminating. Lower courts have 
the demonstrated capacity to adjust very quickly and accurate-
ly to discrete changes in the canonical landscape, and they also 
seem to move roughly in parallel with the Supreme Court when 
it comes to broader interpretive tendencies. In some instances, 
however, there is slippage between the practices in the Su-
preme Court and the lower courts. In addition, the examples 
discussed here provide some basis to form generalizations 
about the factors that improve or detract from the system‘s re-
sponsiveness to interpretive changes. But one major conclusion 
is that there is still much we need to learn. Further research—
examining other canons and digging more deeply into the role 
of particular contextual factors—would likely yield additional 
insights and move us closer to a complete understanding of how 
various canons are communicated through the judicial hierar-
chy. 
 
